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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay, “Stock market liquidity, 
aggregate analyst forecast errors, and the economy,” is motivated by Næs, Skjeltorp, and 
Ødegaard (2011), who suggest that stock market liquidity is a good leading indicator of the 
economy. To further understand the mechanism in the economic forecastability of stock market 
liquidity, we hypothesize that analyst earnings forecast errors have a systematic component, 
which is predictable and related to changes in the economy, and that smart investors exploit 
analyst forecast errors, which leads to the economic forecastability of stock market liquidity. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that there is a strong correlation between detrended 
aggregate analyst forecast errors and concurrent GDP growth and that a large part of the forecast 
errors can be predicted using lagged macro variables. Once we control for the predictable 
forecast errors, the economic forecastability of stock market liquidity disappears. Thus, our study 
reveals that aggregate analyst forecast errors are very informative about business cycle and 
contain all the relevant information for stock market liquidity as a leading economic indicator. 
 The second essay, “Stock price delay and business cycle,” is motivated by Hou and 
Moskowitz (2005), who use common stock price delay in reflecting market-wide information to 
measure market frictions each individual firm faces. To better understand how the price 
formation process is affected by business cycle, we examine the relation between the aggregate 
stock price delay and changes in the economy. Surprisingly, while the stock market liquidity 
declines and market frictions increase before economic downturns, we find that the aggregate 
price delay decreases before recessions; and it increases before economic expansions when the 
stock market liquidity increases and market frictions decrease. Aggregate institutional holdings 
ix 
 
and aggregate analyst coverage as proxies for information production cannot account for the 
behavior of aggregate price delay. Instead, we find that the flight-to-quality behavior of investors 
is most responsible for changes in aggregate price delay. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 This dissertation consists of two essays. The first one, “stock market liquidity, aggregate 
analyst forecast errors, and the economy,” studies the role played by aggregate analyst forecast 
errors in the economic predictability of stock market liquidity, and the second essay, “stock price 
delay and business cycle,” examines what factors may affect aggregate stock price delay during a 
business cycle. The common theme of my two essays is how the economy and the stock market 
are interrelated, particularly on how market frictions anticipate and react to changes in economic 
conditions. 
 Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011) document stock market liquidity has a predicting 
power on future economy. My first essay extends their finding and addresses the following 
research questions. Since trading in the stock market affects stock market liquidity, could trading 
from more informed investors provide an explanation for the predictability of stock market 
liquidity on future economy? In addition, because analysts' earnings forecasts of firms influence 
investors' expectation about future economy, could aggregate analyst forecast errors play a role 
to facilitate those informed investors to utilize their information advantage over other investors? 
We find that aggregate analyst forecast errors are predictable and that stock market liquidity 
loses its explanation power on future economy once we control aggregate analyst forecast errors. 
Our findings suggest that informed investors foresee changes of economy unexpected by analysts 
and aggregate analyst forecast errors help informed investors' trading on their private information.
 Hou and Moskowitz (2005) document that stocks with a delay to reflect public market 
information possess a price delay premium cross-sectionally. In a time series fashion, my second 
essay studies whether stocks reflect public market information at different speeds during a 
business cycle. We find that aggregate stock price delay tends to decrease before a recession 
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starts and tends to increase after a recession ends. Even though Hameed, Kang, Viswanathan 
(2010) document stock market liquidity worsens when stock market declines, the trading 
difficulty does not seem to delay public market information impounded into stocks. In addition, 
although Brockman, Liebenberg, and Schutte (2010) document information production activities 
are pro-cyclical, lower information production activities also fail to account for the pro-cyclical 
behavior of aggregate stock price delay. We find that the flight-to-quality behavior of investors 
mentioned in McQueen, Pinegar, and Thorley (1996) and Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011) 
are most responsible for the pro-cyclical aggregate stock price delay behavior. Our findings help 
our understanding of stock price formation process during a business cycle and suggest 
aggregate stock price delay could be a state variable. 
 This dissertation contributes to our understanding of the systematic component of 
financial analysts earnings forecast errors, stock price delay changes in a business cycle, and 
flight-to-quality behavior of investors. First of all, aggregate analyst forecast errors highly 
correlate with concurrent GDP growth and could be predicted by past macro variables such as 
stock market excess return, stock market volatility, term spread, and default spread. Our findings 
suggest aggregate analyst forecast errors also help informed trading and provide an explanation 
of the predictability of stock market liquidity on the economy. Second, aggregate stock price 
delay exhibits a pro-cyclical pattern. The information quality of the stock market seems better 
when the economy is bad and when the uncertainty of investors is high. Finally, aggregate 
analyst forecast errors facilitate flight-to-quality behavior of smart investors. In addition, flight-
to-quality behavior of investors is most responsible for the pro-cyclical behavior of aggregate 
stock price delay. Those findings further help us understand the interaction between the stock 
market and the real economy. 
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CHAPTER 2: STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY, AGGREGATE ANALYST FORECAST 
ERRORS, AND THE ECONOMY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Stock market liquidity usually starts to fall before recessions. According to Næs, 
Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011), this phenomenon is closely related to the “flight-to-quality” 
behavior of  investors.
1
 Their finding suggests that a group of smart investors could foresee the 
future economy conditions which could not be predicted by other investors who buy shares sold 
by those smart investors. When anticipating economic downturns, in order to protect their wealth, 
smart investors adjust their portfolio compositions from riskier and less liquid stocks to stocks 
with higher liquidity and lower risk, Treasury securities, or even just cash. Their sells tend to 
lead stock market liquidity to decrease. As a result, we often observe declines in overall stock 
market liquidity level before recessions start. Thus, Næs et al. (2011) suggest that stock market 
liquidity is a good leading indicator of the economy. In this paper, we extend their study to 
provide a better understanding of the channel through which stock market liquidity is a good 
economic predictor. Our main finding is that smart investors’ economic forecastability is largely 
built on foreseeing systematic analyst forecast errors, which are predictable and vary with 
business cycle. 
Financial analysts spend their efforts on gathering, studying, and analyzing available 
information on individual companies and then forecast their earnings. Fried and Givoly (1982) 
document that financial analyst forecasts provide a better surrogate for market expectations than 
those generated by time-series models because analysts tend to use a broader information set and 
                                                          
1
 According to Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011), the term “flight-to-quality” refers to a situation where market 
participants suddenly shift their portfolios toward securities with less risk. 
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more timely information.
2
 Recently, Howe, Unlu, and Yan (2009) further show that, in addition 
to firm-specific information, analyst recommendations are also partly based on market-level and 
industry-level information. They find that aggregation of analysts’ stock recommendations 
cancels out the idiosyncratic components and that the aggregate analyst recommendations 
corrrespond to systematic factors. They also find that changes in the aggregate analyst 
recommendations can predict future stock market returns. Their finding suggests that aggregate 
analyst recommendations are informative and useful to stock market investors.  
However, facing economic uncertainty and firm-specific risk factors, analysts are bound 
to produce forecast errors on individual firms’ earnings. Furthermore, financial analysts may also 
provide biased reports. For example, Dreman and Berry (1995) find that analysts tend to 
overestimate earnings, on average, by a significant amount. Similarly, Easterwood and Nutt 
(1999) find that analysts underreact to negative information, but overreact to positive 
information, which implies that analysts exhibit systematic optimism in response to information. 
To explain the optimism behavior, Hong and Kubik (2003) show that controlling for accuracy, 
analysts who are optimistic relative to the consensus are more likely to experience favorable job 
separations. Thus, in addition to economic uncertainty, analysts’ behavioral bias could add to 
their forecast errors. 
Following the logic of Howe, Unlu, and Yan (2009), we aggregate individual firms’ 
analyst earnings forecast errors to cancel out their idiosyncratic components in the forecast errors, 
and to isolate their systematic component, which would largely reflect changes in the economy 
unforeseen by analysts and their systematic behavioral biases. In particular, if analysts do not 
                                                          
2
 See also Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), who document that information on revisions in analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings is valuable to investors. More recently, Chen and Zhao (2010) show that using direct cash flow (analyst 
earnings) forecasts, there is a significant component of cash flow news in stock returns. 
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fully anticipate when economic downturns and expansions would occur, their earnings forecasts 
are likely to be too optimistic before recessions and too pessimistic before expansions. This 
suggests that aggregate analyst earnings forecast errors and changes in the economy are likely to 
be correlated.  
Would smart investors foresee and exploit systematic analyst forecast errors? If they do, 
then systematic analyst forecast errors could be a major culprit in facilitating the “flight-to-
quality” behavior in which smart investors sell risky securities and other (less informed) 
investors are willing to buy them before economic downturns. Thus, we believe the question is 
important and could lead us to better understand the mechanism in the economic forecastability 
of stock market liquidity. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that analyst earnings forecast errors have a systematic 
component, which is predictable and related to changes in the economy, and that smart investors 
exploit analyst forecast errors, which leads to the economic forecastability of stock market 
liquidity. Our hypothesis is built on the following assumptions. First, smart investors can foresee 
analyst earnings forecast errors and sell risky securities when analysts are collectively too 
optimistic, and buy risky securities when they are collectively too pessimistic. Second, analysts 
tend to be too optimistic (pessimistic) before economic downturns (expansions) occur. Third, 
smart investors’ sells (buys) can trigger other market participants to sell (buy) as they learn more 
about market conditions and lead to decreases (increases) in stock market liquidity. 
Thus, our hypothesis suggests that decreases in stock market liquidity would precede 
negative aggregate analyst earnings forecast errors (i.e., actual earnings are collectively lower 
than analyst forecasts), which tend to take place in economic downturns. Conversely, increases 
in stock market liquidity would precede positive aggregate analyst earnings forecast errors (i.e., 
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actual earnings are collectively higher than analyst forecasts), which tend to arise during 
economic  expansions. In other words, our hypothesis suggests that the economic forecastability 
of stock market liquidity is through systematic analyst forecast errors. 
We test our hypothesis using quarterly real GDP growth to represent the change in 
economy in each quarter and our sample period is from 1987Q1 to 2010Q4. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find a strong correlation between detrended aggregate analyst forecast errors and 
concurrent real GDP growth. Furthermore, detrended aggregate analyst forecast errors are 
negatively correlated to lagged stock market volatility, and positively correlated to lagged term 
spread and lagged market excess returns. Using the lagged macro variables, about one third of 
the variation in detrended aggregate analyst forecast errors can be predicted. 
The predicted forecast errors have a strong relation with stock market liquidity, while the 
part of the forecast errors not predicted by the macro variables has a very weak relation with 
stock market liquidity. Interestingly, the economic forecastability of stock market liquidity, as 
documented by Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011), disappear once we control for the 
predicted forecast errors. To further illustrate, we decompose real GDP growth into two parts, 
one related and the other unrelated to aggregate analyst earnings forecast errors, and find that 
while the part of real GDP growth related to aggregate analyst forecast errors can be significantly 
explained by the previous quarter’s stock market liquidity change, the part unrelated to the 
aggregate analyst forecast errors has virtually no relation with the previous quarter’s stock 
market liquidity change. 
In sum, the evidence implies that stock market liquidity as an economic leading indicator 
is built on systematic analyst forecast errors. While analysts provide useful information to market 
participants, smart investors foresee systematic analyst forecast errors. Stock market liquidity, by 
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capturing smart investors’ collective behavior on systematic analyst forecast errors, becomes 
informative on changes in the economy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature 
on analyst earnings forecasts and on business cycle, and then discuss our hypothesis. Section 1.3 
describes the data and the variables used in our study. Section 1.4 reports empirical results, and 
sectional 1.5 contains our concluding remarks.  
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis 
This study links two strands of the finance and accounting literature. The first one is 
analysts’ information production, and the second strand is the flight-to-quality behavior of 
investors. We first review each strand of the literature relevant to our study, after which we form 
our hypothesis. 
2.2.1 Analysts and Information Production 
 Are financial analysts’ earnings forecasts informative? Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) 
study the information content of revisions in analyst earnings forecasts by analyzing the relation 
between the direction of revisions and stock price behavior. They find that stocks have 
significant abnormal returns during the two months following the revision month, suggesting that 
analyst earnings forecasts provide useful information to investors and that the information 
diffuses over time. Fried and Givoly (1982) further compare analyst earnings forecasts to 
predictions generated by time-series models commonly used in research, and show that analyst 
forecasts provide a better surrogate for market expectations than forecasts generated by time-
series models. They argue that the advantage of financial analysts’ forecasts comes from two 
factors: one is the broadness of the information set (firm-specific, industry, and market) available 
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to them and the other is their timing advantage, in that financial analysts employ information that 
becomes available after the last accounting reports.  
However, numerous studies document biases in analyst forecasts. For example, Dreman 
and Berry (1995) examine the quality of analyst earnings forecasts from 1974 through the first 
quarter of 1991. They find that analysts’ forecast errors are larger than one might expect; that 
these errors are increasing over time; and that analysts are optimistic on the average. Easterwood 
and Nutt (1999) show that analysts underreact to negative information but overreact to positive 
information and conclude that analysts exhibit systematic optimism in response to information. 
Francis and Philbrick (1993) argue that optimistic forecasts allow analysts to maintain close 
relationships with company managers, while Clayman and Schwartz (1994) attribute the 
optimism to the tendency of analysts to “fall in love” with the stocks they cover. Lim (2001) 
suggest that because financial analysts trade off bias to improve management access and forecast 
accuracy, statistically optimal forecasts, in the sense of minimum expected squared error, may be 
positively and predictably biased. Hong and Kubik (2003) further explain that biased earnings 
forecasts may come from analysts’ career concerns. They show that although analysts who 
produce relatively accurate forecasters are more likely to experience favorable career outcomes, 
such as moving up to a high-status brokerage house, after controlling for accuracy, analysts who 
are optimistic relative to the consensus are more likely to experience favorable job separations. 
Thus, analysts have incentives to provide optimistic reports. 
Furthermore, Ljungqvist et al. (2009) demonstrate that analyst optimism increases 
chances of analysts’ banks to win co-management appointments, which increases the likelihood 
of winning underwriting businesses in the future. Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) show 
that while institutional investors tend to discount analyst recommendations, individual investors 
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tend to follow analysts’ buy, hold and sell recommendations literally. Also, Kolasinski and 
Kothari (2008) find that target and acquirer analysts use earnings forecasts and recommendations 
to increase the odds of approving the deal by shareholders. 
Nevertheless, Kadan et al. (2009) document that following the Global Analyst Research 
Settlement,
3
optimistic recommendations have become less frequent and more informative, 
whereas neutral and pessimistic recommendations have become more frequent and less 
informative.  Thus, existing studies on analyst behavior suggest that possible systematic forecast 
errors may exist and vary over time. 
Sadka and Sadka (2009) find that when they include more firms into a portfolio, the 
portfolio returns are better able to predict the portfolio earnings changes. Their findings are 
consistent with the hypothesis that predictability increases in the process of aggregation. Howe, 
Unlu, and Yan (2009) also argue that aggregation of analyst recommendations cancels out the 
idiosyncratic components and isolate their common response to systematic factors. Moreover, 
Hameed, Morck, Shen, and Yeung (2008) use the number of analysts following a stock to 
distinguish “high profile” stocks from neglected stocks and document that the prices of neglected 
stocks tend to co-move with those of intensively covered stocks in the same industry. Their 
results suggest that analyst forecasts include common information, which could also be relevant 
to neglected stocks.  
2.2.2 The Flight-to-quality Behavior of Investors 
The “flight-to-quality” or “flight-to-liquidity” phenomenon describes the notion that 
anticipating bad markets ahead, market participants shift their portfolios toward liquid securities 
                                                          
3
 The Global Analyst Research Settlement was an enforcement agreement reached on Apr 28, 2003 between the 
SEC, NASD, NYSE and ten of the United States’s largest investment firms to address issues of conflict of interest 
within their businesses. 
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with less risk. In particular, in times of economic turmoil, Treasury bonds are considered by 
many market participants as a safe haven. Longstaff (2004) compare zero-coupon Treasury bond 
prices with prices of zero-coupon bonds issued by Refcorp, a U.S. government agency, which are 
guaranteed by the Treasury, and find a large flight-to-liquidity premium in Treasury bonds even 
though the two bonds have identical future cash flows and the same credit risk. Longstaff (2004) 
shows that the yield difference between Refcorp and Treasury bonds tend to be larger when 
Treasury bonds become more popular, for example, when the consumer confidence index 
reported by the Conference Board shows a sudden decline, which “may signal that there is a 
greater wariness among market participants holding riskier assets, perhaps encouraging some to 
migrate to the safe haven of Treasuries.” 
 Næs et al. (2011) note that the “flight-to-quality” phenomenon leads to declines in stock 
market liquidity,
4
 and show that changes in stock market liquidity can predict future business 
cycle in both the United States and Norway. Furthermore, they show that participation in small 
firms decreases when the economy (and market liquidity) worsens and that the economic 
forecastability of stock market liquidity is largely derived from changes in liquidity of small 
firms, rather than from large firms. Their findings are consistent with the notion that since it 
would be difficult to sell risky assets in turbulent markets, smart investors anticipate economic 
downturns and dispose stocks of small firms before market turmoil occurs. Consequently, Næs et 
al. (2011) suggest that stock market liquidity change in one quarter is a good predictor of the 
                                                          
4
 Numerous studies have linked stock liquidity to informed trading. For example, Nyholm (2002) examines the 
relation between stock liquidity and the probability of informed trading (PIN) developed by Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, 
and Paperman (1996). They document that a firm’s quoted spread is positively correlated with its estimated PIN. 
Similarly, Heflin and Shaw (2000) use block ownership as a proxy for informed investors and document that firms 
with greater block ownership have larger quoted spreads, effective spreads, adverse selection spread components, 
and smaller depths. Also, Cheng, Firth, Leung, and Rui (2006) examine the impacts of directors’ dealings on firm 
liquidity and find that bid-ask spread widens and depth falls on insider trading days as compared to non-insider 
trading days. However, in the setting of information diffusion, smart investors’ buys (sells) could signal good (bad)  
markets ahead and attract more (less) liquidity traders and lead to increases (decreases) in stock liquidity. 
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next quarter’s GDP change. The predictability holds even after controlling for well known 
explanatory variables, including the term spread, the default spread, stock market volatility, and 
stock market excess returns. 
2.2.3 Hypothesis  
  Næs et al.’s (2011) study raises an intriguing question: When smart investors dispose 
stocks of risky firms before market turmoil occurs, why would other investors be willing to buy 
those shares? Could it be that analysts are still optimistic at that time and that while general 
investors believe analyst earnings forecasts, smart investors foresee errors in analyst earnings 
forecasts?  
It is conceivable that if changes in economy are somewhat surprises to analysts, their 
forecasts would be too optimistic before economic downturns and too pessimistic before 
economic expansions, and that smart investors would first act on and then other investors would 
catch up on systematic analyst forecast errors. Based on this presumption, we hypothesize that 
systematic analyst forecast errors is a channel through which smart investors’ trading leads to 
changes in stock market liquidity before changes in economy are realized.  
To obtain systematic analyst forecast errors, we can aggregate individual firms’ analyst 
forecast errors. Our hypothesis suggests that aggregate analyst earnings forecast errors are 
predictable and related to business cycle, and play a key role in the economic forecastability of 
stock market liquidity.  We next discuss the data we use for testing our hypothesis. 
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Stock Market Liquidity 
Following Næs et al. (2011), we use Amihud’s (2002) price impact measure 
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to measure stock liquidity in a quarter, where TD  is the number of trading days in the quarter t; 
and 
,i sR  and ,i sVOL  are stock i’s absolute return and dollar trading volume (in millions), 
respectively, on day s. Specifically, we first collect a sample of common stocks, which meet two 
conditions: (1) listed on the NYSE for the whole calendar year and (2) having share price above 
$1 in the whole year.
 5
 On the quarterly average, there are about 1611 firms in the sample. Next, 
we calculate each stock’s ILLIQ and then average across the sample stocks to obtain the stock 
market liquidity measure in the quarter t. Since it is an illiquidity measure, a higher number of 
the measure means that the stock market is less liquid. The major advantage of this measure is its 
responsiveness to the changes in the market liquidity environment.
6
 Finally, we take the 
difference in the logarithm to measure the liquidity change in the stock market, i.e.,  
1ln( / )t t tdILLIQ ILLIQ ILLIQ   (2.2) 
2.3.2 Analyst Forecast Errors 
 We use I/B/E/S database from Thomson Reuters to collect individual firms’ quarterly 
analyst earnings forecasts and actual earnings, and obtain two measures for a firm’s analyst 
earnings forecast in a given quarter: one is the mean of all available earnings forecasts for the 
                                                          
5
 Dr. Randi Næs kindly tells us their data selection criteria as follows: We use only common shares of firms listed at 
the NYSE. We also apply some filters where we require a stock to be in the sample (i.e. listed) for the whole year to 
be included in the calculations, and require the stocks to have a price above 1 USD during the entire year. This is 
mainly to reduce some noise. It does not affect the market-wide series in any way since the cross-section is so large. 
6
 During the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009, the aggregate illiquidity (Amihud 2002) measure reached the highest 
point in the first quarter of 2009, when the stock market hit the bottom.  
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firm in the quarter,
7
 and the other is the last forecast in the quarter for the firm. Since our 
analysis yields virtually the same results, we focus on the mean in this paper. Since firms usually 
announce their earnings in a month or two after the end of a fiscal quarter, which vary across 
firms, we use the following scheme to synchronize calendar quarters and fiscal quarters. For 
firms’ fiscal quarter ends in January, February, or last December, their analysts’ quarterly 
earnings forecasts are classified into the first quarter in the current year. For firms’ fiscal quarter 
ends in March, April, or May, their analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts are classified into the 
second quarter in the current year. For firms’ fiscal quarter ends in June, July, or August, their 
analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts are classified into the third quarter in the current year. 
Similarly, for firms’ fiscal quarter ends in September, October, and November, their analysts’ 
quarterly earnings forecasts will be classified into the fourth quarter in the current year. The 
synchronization allows us later on to match analyst forecast errors and changes in GDP in 
calendar time. 
Following Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996),
8
 we define the standardized analyst 
forecast error (SAFE) of a quarter as the current quarterly difference between a firm’s actual 
quarterly earnings and the firm’s quarterly analyst earnings forecast and then standardize the 
difference with the standard deviation of the quarterly earning difference from past eight quarters, 
i.e.,
9
 
                                                          
7
 With a fixed forecast period end date (FPEDATS), there will be several I/B/E/S statistical periods (STATPERS). 
We use all available mean estimate (MEANEST) to get the average analyst earnings forecast of a firm in a quarter. 
8
 Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) define their standardized unexpected earnings as 
 quarterseight prior  in the change earnings ofdeviation  Standard
earningsquarterly  Expected -earningsQuarterly 
SUE
 
9
 Therefore, stocks without sufficient previous analyst earnings forecasts will not be included in the sample. 
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Quarterly actual EPS- Expected quarterly EPS from analysts
Standard deviation of EPS difference in the prior eight quarters 
SAFE        (2.3) 
Furthermore, following the data selection criteria of Næs et al. (2011), we include only common 
stocks (with share code 10 or 11 from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)) listed 
on the NYSE for the whole calendar year and with stock price above $1 per share in our 
construction of aggregate analyst earnings forecast errors. From 1987 to 2010, there are around 
1,728 common stocks listed on NYSE; among them, 1,611 were traded above $1 per share and 
listed for the whole year. From the above sample, there are about 778 firms with analyst 
coverage each quarter on the average from 1987 to 2010. We construct the aggregate analyst 
forecast errors (AAFE) by taking the equally-weighted average of the standardized analyst 
forecast error (SAFE) of each firm with analyst coverage in a quarter. 
After the Global Settlement in 2003,
10
 analysts tend to become more conservative than 
before. Figure 2.1 shows that there is an upward trend for the aggregate analyst forecast errors 
during the sample period. We remove the time trend of the aggregate analyst forecast errors and 
test whether the detrended aggregate analyst forecast errors are stationary. The augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test rejects the null hypothesis that the aggregate analyst forecast errors 
have a unit root, suggesting the aggregate analyst forecast errors series are stationary. Hence, we 
use the level of detrended aggregate analyst forecast errors to perform our analysis. 
2.3.3 Economy Data 
We use seasonally adjusted quarterly real gross domestic product (GDP) from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis to measure the economy state. The quarterly data are in the unit of billions of 
                                                          
10
 See Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009). 
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chained 2005 dollars. Following Næs, et al. (2011), we take the difference in the logarithm of 
real GDP to measure the quarterly change in the economy, i.e.,  
Figure 2.1 Aggregate Standardized Analyst Forecast Errors (AAFE) and Their Time Trend 
The figure shows time-series plots of the original aggregate standardized analyst forecast errors from the sample 
firms in this study. The sample firms include common stocks listed on the NYSE with stock price above $1 per 
share, listing for the whole calendar year, and with analyst coverage. The sample period is from 1987Q1 to 2010Q4. 
The solid line describes the time-trend of the aggregate standardized analyst earnings forecast errors during the 
sample period. 
)/ln( 1 ttt GDPRGDPRdGDPR  (2.4) 
While our focus is to examine the role of aggregate analyst earnings forecast errors in 
economic forecastability of stock market liquidity, we include several control variables, which 
could also be linked to the economy state. First, Fama and French (1989) document that the 
default spread (yield difference between low grade bonds and high grade bonds) is high during 
periods like the Great Depression when business is persistently poor and low during periods 
when the economy is persistently strong. Fama and French (1989) also show that the term spread 
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(yield difference between 10-year Treasury note and 3-month Treasury bill) tends to be low near 
business cycle peaks and high near troughs. Thus, they suggest that the default spread is a long-
term business condition variable, and the term spread as a short-term business cycle variable. In 
our analysis, we include the term spread and the default spread as control variables.
11
 
Also included as control variables are the market excess return and market return 
volatility since stock market prices have been considered as an important leading indicator of the 
economy. Following Næs, et al. (2011), we use the 3-month cumulative monthly S&P 500 index 
return in excess of monthly risk-free rate as the quarterly market excess return (Mkt_Ret). As for 
market return volatility, we calculate each common stock’s quarterly return volatility from daily 
returns for common stocks in our sample (listed on NYSE with stock price above $1 for the 
whole calendar year), and then take the equally-weighted average as quarterly market volatility 
(Mkt_Vol). The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests show that all of these control variables are 
stationary. 
2.3.4 Summary Statistics of the Variables 
Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics of the variables discussed above. During the 96 
quarters from 1987Q1 to 2010Q4, the mean (and last forecast) of the aggregate standardized 
analyst forecast errors (AAFE) change from negative in the first time period (1987Q1 to 1990Q4) 
to positive in the last decade (2001Q1 to 2010Q4). Figure 1 plots the time series of AAFE, which 
shows an obvious time trend, indicating that analysts collectively tend to exhibit more optimism 
in the early period than in the later period. In the analyses that follow, we use the 
detrended_AAFE to capture systematic analyst forecast errors.  
                                                          
11
 Our analysis uses the default spread defined as the difference between Moody’s Baa rate and Moody’s Aaa rate. 
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In terms of market liquidity, the aggregate illiquidity level decreases from 0.73 in the late 
80s to 0.35 from 1991 to 2000, and further decreases to 0.07 in the past decade (2001 to 2010). 
The average real GDP growth rate is around 0.65% per quarter during the sample period but has 
a lower growth rate of 0.41% during the past decade, compared to 0.69% during the earlier 
period from 1987 to 1990 and 0.87% from 1991 to 2000. The average stock market volatility 
during the sample period is around 2.46% and the overall market tends to have higher volatility 
during the most recent decade. This suggests that investors tend to face more uncertainty during 
the recent period than before, consistent with Campbell, et al. (2001). 
The average term spread is around 1.81% during the sample period and has a higher 
mean of 1.98% during the most recent decade, compared to 1.53% in the earlier period from 
1987 to 1990 and 1.74% from 1991 to 2000. The average default spread is around 0.97% during 
the sample period and it also has a higher mean value of 1.16% during the most recent decade, 
relative to 0.75% from 1991 to 2000. The mean market excess return is around 1.02% per quarter 
during the sample period, and ranges from -0.71% per quarter during the most recent decade to 
2.92% per quarter from 1991 to 2000.  
Table 2.2 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables. The GDP 
growth rate in a quarter shows significant negative correlations with stock market liquidity 
change, default spread, and market volatility in the previous quarter, but has a positive 
correlation with the previous quarter’s market excess return.  
These correlations suggest that stock market illiquidity, default spread, and market 
volatility tend to increase (decrease) and the stock market tends to fall (rise) before economic 
downturns (upturns). In short, stock market liquidity, volatility, and excess returns, and default 
spread appear to be good leading economic indicators, and can be used to help forecast the 
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direction of the economy. Interestingly, the GDP growth rate has a significant positive 
correlation of 0.45 with the concurrent detrended_AAFE(mean) and 0.43 with 
detrended_AAFE(last forecast).  
Figure 2.2 shows that there is clear comovement between these two series (GDP growth 
and detrended_AAFE(mean)). Furthermore, like GDP growth, detrended_AAFE also has 
significant positive correlations with term spread and market excess return in the previous 
quarter and significant negative correlations with previous quarter’s default spread and market 
volatility. These correlations are consistent with the notion that analyst earnings forecast errors 
on individual firms contain a systematic component and that analysts collectively tend to be too 
optimistic right before economic downturns, which results in negative forecast errors, and too 
pessimistic right before economic upturns, which results in positive forecast errors.  
 It is worth pointing out that while the GDP growth has a significant negative correlation 
of -0.33 with the previous quarter change in stock market liquidity, detrended_AAFE (mean) 
seems to have a stronger negative correlation of -0.47 with the previous quarter change in stock 
market liquidity. If the economic forecastability of stock market liquidity reflects smart 
investors’ information advantages, the stronger negative correlation between detrended_AAFEt  
(mean) and ILLIQt-1, along with a large positive correlation between detrended_AAFEt and 
dGDPRt, provide a first hint that smart investors’ information advantages could lie on their 
foreseeing and exploiting systematic analyst forecast errors. In the next section, we formally 
address this issue using regression analysis.    
2.4 Regression Results 
This section first uses multivariate regression analyses to address two issues. First, to 
what extent aggregate analyst forecast errors can be predicted using macro variables?                                                                                                 
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics of the Relevant Variables 
Variables 1987Q1to2010Q4 1987Q1to1990Q4 1991Q1to2000Q4 2001Q1to2010Q4 
Sample firms 
ILLIQ 
 
0.30 0.73 0.35 0.07 
dILLIQ -0.0223 0.0624 -0.0499 -0.0287 
Mkt_Vol 2.46% 2.36% 2.42% 2.55% 
Avg_number_of_firms 1610.54 1670.75 1815.80 1381.20 
Sample firms with analyst coverage 
(mean) 
    AAFE 
 
-0.0685 -0.4900 -0.1621 0.1937 
detrended_AAFE -0.0004 -0.0379 0.0212 -0.0070 
avg_number_of_firms 778.31 645.31 828.25 781.58 
Sample firms with analyst coverage 
(last forecast) 
    AAFE 
 
0.2176 -0.3164 0.1370 0.5118 
detrended_AAFE 0.0086 -0.0814 0.0612 -0.0079 
avg_number_of_firms 619.47 412.63 662.73 658.95 
Sample firms with earnings information     
SUE -0.0274 -0.0430 -0.0309 -0.0177 
avg_number_of_firms 1271.36 1229.63 1362.50 1196.93 
Economy variables 
GDPR 
 
10434.19 7711.76 9436.77 12520.58 
dGDPR 0.0065 0.0069 0.0087 0.0041 
Term_Spread 1.81% 1.53% 1.74% 1.98% 
Default_Spread 0.97% 1.08% 0.75% 1.16% 
Mkt_Ret 1.02% 0.57% 2.92% -0.71% 
 
This table reports the average values of the variables used in this study during the whole sample period and each sub-period. The sample firms include NYSE 
common stocks with stock price above $1 and listed for the whole calendar year. The sample firms with analyst coverage include the aforementioned sample 
firms that have I/B/E/S analyst earnings forecast data (summary history and detail history) available. The standardized aggregate analyst forecast error of a firm 
in a given quarter is the difference between actual earnings and estimated earnings from analysts standardized by the previous eight quarters’ standard deviation 
of the difference. The aggregate standardized analyst forecast error, AAFE, is the equally-weighted average across the sample firms with analyst coverage. The 
detrended aggregate standardized analyst forecast error, detrended_AAFE, removes the time trend of the original series during the sample period. Mean is from 
summary history and last forecast is from detail history. SUE uses the actual earnings reported 4 quarters before as the benchmark. ILLIQ is the average 
illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) across the sample firms, and dILLIQ is the logarithm difference between the current quarter’s and the previous quarter’s 
ILLIQ. Mkt_Vol is market volatility obtained from equally weighted average of the sample firms’ stock daily return standard deviation during the quarter. GDPR  
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(Table 2.1 continued) 
is the real GDP is in billions of chained 2005 dollars, and dGDPR is real GDP growth, measured by the logarithm difference between the current quarter’s and 
the previous quarter’s GDPR. Term_Spread is the yield difference between 10-year Treasury note rate and 3-month Treasury bill rate; and Default_Spread is the 
difference between Moody’s Baa bond yield and Moody’s Aaa bond yield. Mkt_Ret is the market excess return proxied by the 3-month cumulative monthly 
excess return between S&P 500 index return and the risk-free rate. 
Table 2.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
detrended_AAFEt 
(mean) 
detrended_AAFEt 
(last forecast) 
ASUEt dILLIQt-1 Term_Spreadt-1 Default_Spreadt-1 Mkt_Rett-1 Mkt_Volt-1 
dGDPRt 0.4475 
(<.0001) 
0.4323 
(<.0001) 
0.3880 
(<.0001) 
-0.3341 
(0.0009) 
0.0114 
(0.9122) 
-0.4685 
(<.0001) 
0.3547 
(0.0004) 
-0.4113 
(<.0001) 
detrended_AAFEt 
(mean) 
 0.7591 
(<.0001) 
0.6152 
(<.0001) 
-0.4714 
(<.0001) 
0.2172 
(0.0335) 
-0.3583 
(0.0003) 
0.3813 
(0.0001) 
-0.4883 
(<.0001) 
detrended_AAFEt 
(last forecast) 
  0.4355 
(<.0001) 
-0.4206 
(<.0001) 
0.0536 
(0.6038) 
-0.4133 
(<0.0001) 
0.3435 
(0.0006) 
-0.3915 
(<.0001) 
ASUEt    -0.3791 
(<.0001) 
-0.0383 
(0.7113) 
-0.6275 
(<.0001) 
0.3024 
(0.0028) 
-0.6715 
(<.0001) 
dILLIQt-1     -0.0644 
(0.5329) 
0.3511 
(0.0005) 
-0.4159 
(<.0001) 
0.5272 
(<.0001) 
Term_Spreadt-1      0.2689 
(0.0081) 
-0.0354 
(0.7323) 
0.1401 
(0.1733) 
Default_Spreadt-1       -0.2928 
(0.0038) 
0.7262 
(<.0001) 
Mkt_Rett-1        -0.4441 
(<.0001) 
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between variables used in the analysis. The associated p-values are reported in parentheses below each 
correlation coefficient. dGDPRt is the logarithm difference between current real GDP and previous real GDP. detrended_AAFEt is the aggregate standardized 
analyst forecast error series taken out time trend. ASUEt is the aggregate standardized earnings surprises. The following variables are from previous quarter. For 
the following lagged variables, dILLIQt-1 is the logarithm difference between current aggregate liquidity level and previous aggregate liquidity level. 
Term_Spreadt-1 is the yield difference between 10-year Treasury note and 3-month Treasury bill. Default_Spreadt-1 is the yield difference between Moody’s Baa 
and Moody’s Aaa. Mkt_Rett-1 is the 3-month cumulative S&P500 monthly return and risk-free rate difference. Mkt_Volt-1 is the equal-weighted 3-month stock 
return standard deviation among NYSE common stocks with share price above $1 and listing for the whole calendar year.           
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Second, could changes in stock market liquidity be linked to predicted aggregate analyst 
forecast errors? Addressing the issues help us connect the notions that changes in stock market 
liquidity reflect smart investors’ trading behavior and that smart investors take advantage of 
predicted analyst forecast errors. The analyses provide a basis for us to further test our 
hypothesis that the economic forecastability of stock market liquidity is through systematic 
analyst forecast errors. We focus on the results from summary history of I/B/E/S (mean) and also 
report results from detail history (last forecast) and standardized earnings surprises.   
 
Figure 2.2 Detrended Aggregate Analyst Forecast Errors (detrended_AAFE) and GDP Growth 
The figure shows the trends of two time series from 1987Q1 to 2010Q4: detrended standardized aggregate analyst 
forecast errors and GDP growth. We take out the linear time trend from the original standardized aggregate analyst 
forecast errors to get the detrended series, and take the logarithm difference between the current real GDP and 
previous quarter’s real GDP number to get the GDP growth series. The left axis is for the detrended aggregate 
standardized analyst forecast errors and the right axis is for the GDP growth. The shaded areas mark the following 
three NBER recessions: July 1990-March1991, March 2001-November 2001, and December 2007-June 2009. 
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2.4.1 Predicting Aggregate Analyst Forecast Errors 
To examine the predictability of aggregate analyst forecast errors, we use the following 
regression model: 
0 1 1 2 1
3 1 4 1
_ * _ * _
* _ * _
t t t
t t t
detrended AAFE b b Mkt Vol b Term Spread
b Default Spread b Mkt Ret 
 
 
  
  
 (2.5) 
Table 2.3 reports the regression results, which show that _ tdetrended AAFE  is significantly and 
negatively related to lagged stock market volatility, and significantly and positively related to 
lagged term spread and lagged market excess returns. The results suggest that analysts 
collectively tend to be too optimistic when stock market returns are lower and more volatile and 
when term spread is smaller, and that, conversely, they tend to be too pessimistic when stock 
market returns are higher and less volatile and when term spread is larger. The adjusted- 2R  of 
the regression in (2.5) is 0.33, suggesting that about one third of the variation in aggregate 
analyst forecast errors is predictable. 
 Based on the results in Table 2.3, we obtain the predicted aggregate analyst forecast error 
in time t as  
t-1 t t-1 t-1
t-1 t-1
E (detrended_AAFE )= 0.28 -13.68* Mkt_Vol +7.84*Term_Spread
-9.31* Default_Spread +0.71* Mkt_Ret
 (2.6) 
and the residual part as 
t t t-1 tresidual_detrended_AAFE = detrended_AAFE - E (detrended_AAFE )  (2.7) 
If smart investors exploit systematic analyst forecast errors, the predictable part of aggregate 
analyst forecast errors is likely to be more useful than the unpredictable part to smart investors. 
Indeed, Table 2.4 shows that stock market liquidity, 1,tdILLIQ   is strongly associated with
 
tt-1E (detrended_AAFE ) but is only marginally associated with tresidual_detrended_AAFE .  
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The strong association between changes in stock market liquidity and predicted 
detrended_AAFE and the strong correlation between real GDP growth and aggregate analyst 
forecast errors reported earlier lead us to consider that the source of the economic forecastability 
of stock market liquidity may lie in analyst forecast errors. We next turn to explore this issue. 
2.4.2 The Source of the Economic Forecastability of Stock Market Liquidity 
We use the following regression model to compare the link strength to real GDP growth, 
,tdGDPR  of changes in stock market liquidity to that of predicted aggregate analyst forecast 
errors: 
t t t0 1 t-1 2 t-1 3 t-1dGDPR =b +b *dILLIQ +b *dGDPR +b * E (detrended_AAFE )+e  (2.8) 
Similar to Naes, Skjeltorp, and Odegaard (2011), Table 2.5 shows that, without 
tt-1E (detrended_AAFE )  in the regression model, tdGDPR  is negatively related to 1,tdILLIQ   
with a Newey-West corrected t-value of -2.65. This confirms the stock market liquidity’s 
economic forecastability in our sample period from 1987 to 2010. However, in the presence of 
tt-1E (detrended_AAFE ) , t
dGDPR  is no longer significantly related to 1tdILLIQ   since its 
Newey-West corrected t-value becomes -1.22. Instead, tdGDPR  is significantly related to 
tt-1E (detrended_AAFE ), with a Newey-West corrected t-value of 2.85. The results suggest that 
while stock market liquidity contains useful information for forecasting future economic activity, 
this information content of stock market liquidity is largely encompassed by predicted aggregate 
analyst forecast errors. Thus, the evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that stock market 
liquidity as an economic leading indicator is built on systematic analyst forecast errors. 
 To further illustrate our point, we decompose real GDP growth into two components: one 
is related and the other is unrelated to aggregate analyst forecast errors. 
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Table 2.3 Predicting Aggregate Analyst Forecast Errors 
 
Panel A: Analyst Earnings Forecast Errors from Summary History of I/B/E/S 
Dependent Variable Constant
 
Mkt_Volt-1 Term_Spreadt-1 Default_Spreadt-1 Mkt_Rett-1 Adjustedj_R
2
 
detrended_AAFEt  
(mean) 0.47*** -19.14*** 
   
0.2303 
 
(4.25) 
 
(-4.06) 
 
    detrended_AAFEt  
(mean) 0.37*** -17.48*** 7.93*** -8.50  0.3057 
 
(3.86) 
 
(-2.71) 
 
(3.52) 
 
(-0.74) 
   
detrended_AAFEt  
(mean) 0.28*** -13.68** 7.84*** -9.31 0.71*** 0.3311 
 (2.76) (-2.07) (3.45) (-0.85) (2.82)  
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Analyst Earnings Forecast Errors from Detail History of I/B/E/S 
Dependent Variable Constant
 
Mkt_Volt-1 Term_Spreadt-1 Default_Spreadt-1 Mkt_Rett-1 Adjustedj_R
2
 
detrended_AAFEt  
(last forecast) 0.32*** -12.49*** 
   
0.1443 
 
(3.34) 
 
(-3.28) 
 
    detrended_AAFEt  
(last forecast) 0.27*** -5.54 3.47 -19.44*  0.1887 
 
(3.50) 
 
(-0.92) 
 
(1.29) 
 
(-1.78) 
   
detrended_AAFEt  
(last forecast) 0.19*** -2.14 3.39 -20.16** 0.64*** 0.2197 
 (2.46) (-0.37) (1.28) (-2.01) (2.84)  
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
25 
 
(Table 2.3 continued) 
Panel C: Standardized Earnings Surprises 
Dependent Variable Constant
 
Mkt_Volt-1 Term_Spreadt-1 Default_Spreadt-1 Mkt_Rett-1 Adjustedj_R
2
 
ASUEt 0.78*** -32.68*** 
   
0.4450 
 
(3.78) 
 
(-3.70) 
 
    ASUEt 0.73*** -21.57*** 3.62 -30.42** 0.4881 
 
(4.95) 
 
(-2.79) 
 
(1.07) 
 
(-2.40) 
   
ASUEt 0.72*** -21.24*** 3.61 -30.11** 0.06 0.4827 
 (5.08) (-2.77) (1.06) (-2.41) (0.21)  
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The table reports the results of regressing detrended aggregate analyst forecast errors on lagged macro variables. The model estimated is  
.t t40 1 t-1 2 t-1 3 t-1 t-1detrended_AAFE =b +b * Mkt_Vol +b *Term_Spread +b * Default_Spread +b * Mkt_Ret +e
                                         
The explanatory variables include market volatility, term spread, default spread, and market excess return. The Newey-West corrected t-statistics (Bartlett kernel 
with a lag length of 2) are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  
 
Table 2.4 Aggregate Analyst Forecast Errors and Stock Market Liquidity Changes 
Panel A: Analyst Earnings Forecast Errors from Summary History of I/B/E/S 
Dependent variable Constant
 
dILLIQt-1 Adjustedj_R
2
 
 
Et-1(detrended_AAFEt) 
(mean) 
 
-0.0065 
(-0.30) 
-0.3607*** 
(-3.31) 
0.2994 
 
residual_dtrended_AAFEt 
(mean) 
-0.0026 
(-0.10) 
-0.1516* 
(-1.81) 
0.0201 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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          (Table 2.4 continued)  
Panel B: Analyst Earnings Forecast Errors from Detail History of I/B/E/S 
Dependent variable Constant
 
dILLIQt-1 Adjustedj_R
2
 
 
Et-1(detrended_AAFEt) 
(last forecast) 
 
0.0048 
(0.31) 
-0.2279** 
(-2.54) 
0.2553 
 
    residual_dtrended_AAFEt 
(last forecast) 
-0.0024 
(-0.09) 
-0.1439** 
(-2.21) 
0.0295 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel C: Standardized Earnings Surprises 
Dependent variable Constant
 
dILLIQt-1 Adjustedj_R
2
 
 
Et-1(ASUEt) 
 
-0.0356 
(-0.98) 
-0.4879** 
(-2.30) 
0.2513 
 
    residual_ASUEt 
-0.0004 
(-0.01) 
-0.02365 
(-0.15) 
-0.0100 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The table reports the results of regressing the two components (predicted and residual) of detrended aggregate analyst forecast errors on stock market liquidity 
changes from 1987 Q1 to 2010 Q4. The regression model used to get the predicted component of detrended aggregate analyst forecast errors, 
t-1 tE (detrended_AAFE ) , is reported in table 2.3:  
t t40 1 t-1 2 t-1 3 t-1 t-1detrended_AAFE =b +b * Mkt_Vol +b *Term_Spread +b * Default_Spread +b * Mkt_Ret +e
 
And the residual component is   
.t t tt-1residual_detrended_AAFE =detrended_AAFE - E (detrended_AAFE )
 
The Newey-West corrected t-statistics (Bartlett kernel with a lag length of 2) are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
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That is, based on the regression model, 
t t t0 1dGDPR =b +b *detrended_AAFE +e  (2.9) 
the related component is ˆ ˆt t0 1AAFE_related_dGDPR =b +b * detrended_AAFE and the 
unrelated component is ._ _ _t t tresidual dGDPR dGDPR AAFE related dGDPR   
If systematic analyst forecast errors contain all the relevant information for the economic 
forecastability of stock market liquidity, then we expect that stock market liquidity has predictive 
power on _ _ tAAFE related dGDPR , but not on _ .tresidual dGDPR  
 Indeed, Table 2.6 shows that _ _ tAAFE related dGDPR  is significantly and negatively 
related to 1tdILLIQ   and that the predictive power of 1tdILLIQ   
remains after controlling for 
market volatility, term spread, default spread, and market excess returns. However, Table 2.6 
also shows that _ tresidual dGDPR  has virtually no relation with 1,tdILLIQ  suggesting that 
1tdILLIQ   
has no predictive power on _ tresidual dGDPR . The results validate that systematic 
analyst forecast errors possess all the pertinent information for stock market liquidity as an 
economic leading indicator.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper extends Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard’s (2011) study to better understand the 
mechanism for stock market liquidity to have the economic forecastability. According to Næs, et 
al. (2011), our empirical results show that the reason that stock market liquidity contains useful 
information for inferring the future state of the economy is because changes in stock market 
liquidity can capture smart investors’ flight-to-quality behavior in which smart investors sell 
risky and hard-to-dispose securities before economic downturns, and buy them before economic 
expansions.  
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Our inquiry starts with a simply question: Why are other investors willing to buy (sell) 
risky and hard-to-dispose securities when smart investors sell (buy) them before economic 
downturns (upturns)? The question leads us to consider that while analyst earnings forecasts 
provide useful information to market participants and help them form market expectations, smart 
investors may foresee and exploit systematic analyst forecast errors. If systematic analyst 
forecast errors are correlated with economic conditions, stock market liquidity, by capturing 
smart investors’ collective behavior on analyst forecast errors, could become informative on 
changes in the economy. 
Thus, we hypothesis that analyst earnings forecast errors have a systematic component, 
which is predictable and related to changes in the economy, and that smart investors exploit 
analyst forecast errors, which leads to the economic forecastability of stock market liquidity. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that there is a strong correlation between detrended 
aggregate analyst forecast errors and concurrent GDP growth and that a large part of the forecast 
errors can be predicted using lagged macro variables. Furthermore, once we control for the 
predictable forecast errors, the economic forecastability of stock market liquidity disappears. In 
sum, our analysis reveals that aggregate analyst forecast errors are very informative on business 
cycle. They contain all the relevant information for stock market liquidity as an economic 
leading indicator. Smart investors foresee changes in economy unexpected by analysts and trade 
upon this private information, causing changes in stock market liquidity. Hence, we observe a 
relationship between stock market liquidity and business cycle. Specifically, smart investors sell 
stocks before the general investment public knows the economy is worsening and before a 
recession starts, and they buy stocks before the general investment public knows the economy is 
improving and before the economy is going to be better. 
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Table 2.5 GDP Growth Rate, Stock Market Liquidity Change, and Predicted Aggregate Analyst Forecast Error 
 
Dependent variable Constant dILLIQt-1 dGDPRt-1 Et-1(AAFEt)(mean) Adjustedj_R
2 
dGDPRt 
0.0014*** 
(2.58) 
 0.4564*** 
(2.97) 
 0.2000 
dGDPRt 
0.0040*** 
(3.30) 
-0.0048*** 
(-2.65) 
0.3908*** 
(2.99) 
 0.2334 
dGDPRt 
0.0046*** 
(4.00) 
 0.3007** 
(2.31) 
0.0110*** 
(3.69) 
0.2686 
dGDPRt 
0.0046*** 
(4.08) 
-0.0022 
(-1.22) 
0.2963** 
(2.29) 
0.0092*** 
(2.85) 
0.2671 
Dependent variable Constant dILLIQt-1 dGDPRt-1 Et-1(AAFEt)(last) Adjustedj_R
2 
dGDPRt 
0.0050*** 
(4.47) 
 0.2147 
(1.65) 
0.0207*** 
(4.51) 
0.3004 
dGDPRt 
0.0049*** 
(4.55) 
-0.0018 
(-1.06) 
0.2143 
(1.66) 
0.0186*** 
(3.83) 
0.2976 
Dependent variable Constant
 
dILLIQt-1 dGDPRt-1 Et-1(ASUEt) Adjustedj_R
2
 
dGDPRt 
0.0050*** 
(4.20) 
 0.2616* 
(1.97) 
0.0078*** 
(4.07) 
0.2631 
dGDPRt 
0.0050*** 
(4.21) 
-0.0026 
(-1.32) 
0.2604* 
(1.98) 
0.0064*** 
(2.99) 
0.2654 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
This table reports the result of regressing GDP growth rate, tdGDPR , on lagged stock market liquidity change, 1tdILLIQ  , and the predicted component of 
the aggregate analyst forecast error, ,t-1 tE (detrended_AAFE ) obtained from the regression results reported in Table 2.3. The model is
 
0 1 1 2 1 3* * *t t tt t t-1dGDPR b b dILLIQ b dGDPR b E (detrended_AAFE )        
The Newey-West corrected t-statistics (Bartlett kernel with a lag length of 2) are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
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Table 2.6 Stock Market Liquidity and the Components of GDP Growth 
 
Panel A: Analyst Earnings Forecast Errors from Summary History of I/B/E/S 
Dependent variable Constant
 
dILLIQt-1 Mkt_Volt-1 Term_Spreadt-1 Default_Spreadt-1 Mkt_Rett-1 Adjustedj_R
2
 
AAFE_related_dGDPRt 
(mean) 
0.0064*** 
(21.44) 
-0.0048*** 
(-3.29) 
    0.2140 
        
AAFE_related_dGDPRt 
(mean) 
0.0084*** 
(9.40) 
-0.0021** 
(-2.24) 
-0.0929 
(-1.54) 
0.0665*** 
(3.05) 
-0.0877 
(-0.91) 
0.0051** 
(2.37) 
0.3547 
        
residual_dGDPRt 
-0.0001 
(-0.07) 
-0.0028 
(-1.23)     
0.0083 
 
        
residual_dGDPRt 
0.0025 
(1.37) 
-0.0003 
(-0.14) 
0.1122 
(1.06) 
-0.0017 
(-0.04) 
-0.5454*** 
(-2.81) 
0.0100 
(1.52) 
0.0922 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel B: Analyst Earnings Forecast Errors From Detail History of I/B/E/S 
Dependent variable Constant
 
dILLIQt-1 Mkt_Volt-1 Term_Spreadt-1 Default_Spreadt-1 Mkt_Rett-1 Adjustedj_R
2
 
AAFE_related_dGDPRt 
(last forecast) 
0.0065*** 
(19.85) 
-0.0041*** 
(-3.33) 
    0.1681 
        
AAFE_related_dGDPRt 
(last forecast) 
0.0077*** 
(7.80) 
-0.0024** 
(-2.40) 
0.0154 
(0.23) 
0.0300 
(1.02) 
-0.2242** 
(-2.11) 
0.0053** 
(2.21) 
0.2532 
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(Table 2.6 continued) 
Dependent variable Constant
 
dILLIQt-1 Mkt_Volt-1 Term_Spreadt-1 Default_Spreadt-1 Mkt_Rett-1 Adjustedj_R
2
 
residual_dGDPRt 
-0.0001 
(-0.08) 
-0.0034 
(-1.42)     
0.0180 
 
        
residual_dGDPRt 
0.0031 
(1.69) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
0.0039 
(0.04) 
0.0348 
(0.87) 
-0.4089*** 
(-2.20) 
0.0098 
(1.50) 
0.0796 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel C: Standardized Earnings Surprises 
Dependent variable Constant
 
dILLIQt-1 Mkt_Volt-1 Term_Spreadt-1 Default_Spreadt-1 Mkt_Rett-1 Adjustedj_R
2
 
ASUE_related_dGDPRt 
0.0065*** 
(19.63) 
-0.0033 
(-1.49) 
    0.1346 
        
ASUE_related_dGDPRt 
0.0113*** 
(13.06) 
-0.0002 
(-0.27) 
-0.1346*** 
(-2.75) 
0.0228 
(1.07) 
-0.1962** 
(-2.43) 
0.0002 
(0.13) 
0.4774 
        
residual_dGDPRt 
-0.0001 
(-0.10) 
-0.0042** 
(-2.20)     
0.0310 
 
        
residual_dGDPRt 
-0.0005 
(-0.28) 
-0.0022 
(-1.16) 
0.1542 
(1.46) 
0.0419 
(0.90) 
-0.4368** 
(-2.11) 
0.0149** 
(2.37) 
0.0741 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
We decompose GDP growth into two components, one related and the other unrelated to aggregate analyst forecast errors, using the regression model 
.t t t0 1dGDPR = b +b * detrended_AAFE +e The first two rows report the results of regressing the component of GDP growth related to aggregate analyst 
forecast errors, tAAFE_related_dGDPR , on stock market liquidity change, tdILLIQ , from 1987Q1 to 2010Q4. The last two rows report the results of 
regressing the component of GDP growth unrelated to aggregate analyst forecast errors, _ tresidual dGDPR , on stock market liquidity change, tdILLIQ , 
from 1987Q1 to 2010Q4. The controlling variables include stock market volatility, term spread, default spread, and market excess return. The Newey-West 
corrected t-statistics (Bartlett kernel with a lag length of 2) are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
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Since aggregate analyst forecast errors are very informative on changes in the economy, 
aggregate analyst forecast errors could become an important state variable for future accounting 
and finance research. Also, since aggregate analyst forecast errors are predictable, the predictable 
part could be a useful investment tool. Moreover, since a large part of aggregate analyst forecast 
errors can be predicted using lagged macro variables, analysts could improve their earnings 
forecasts by taking into account the macro variables’ predictability. We leave these issues for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER 3: STOCK PRICE DELAY AND BUSINESS CYCLE 
3.1  Introduction 
 Fama’s (1970) efficient market hypothesis posits that stock price quickly reflects 
available information. However, some stocks reflect market-wide information with a delay. Hou 
and Moskowitz (2005) use stock price delay in reflecting market-wide information to measure 
the extent of market frictions each individual firm encounters. Market frictions include 
transaction costs, stock illiquidity, and information asymmetry. They find that market frictions 
associated with lack of investor recognition appears the most responsible for causing price 
delay.
12
 As firms become more popular, according to Hou and Moskowitz (2005), price delay 
measures of those stocks should decrease.  
While Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) show that bad firm specific news of small firms and 
firms with low analyst coverage travels slowly, McQueen, Pinegar, and Thorley (1996) find that 
small stocks tend to quickly adjust to bad common information as conveyed through large stocks, 
but adjust slowly to good common information.
13
 It is conceivable that small stocks are less 
liquid and face higher market frictions, which may cause price delay in reflecting information. 
                                                          
12
 Hou and Moskowitz (2005)'s investor recognition variables are log of institutional ownership, log of number of 
analysts, shareholders, and employees, log of advertising expense, a regional exchange dummy, the average distance 
between each stock's headquarters and all U.S. airports as well as the nearest airport, and the average airfare between 
the nearest airport and all U.S. airports. 
13
 McQueen, Pinegar, and Thorley (1996) document a directional asymmetry in the small stock concurrent and 
lagged response to large stock movements. When returns on large stocks are negative, the concurrent beta for small 
stocks is high, but the lagged beta is insignificant. This regression result shows bad common information travels fast 
to large and small stocks. However, when returns on large stocks are positive, small stocks have small concurrent 
betas and very significant lagged betas. This finding suggests good common information travels slowly to small 
stocks. 
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What makes the findings of these studies interesting is that price delay is asymmetric and 
depends on information types.  
To further understand the price formation process at the market level, we extend Hou and 
Moskowitz (2005) to study aggregate price delay. In particular, we are interested in learning 
what factors may affect aggregate price delay and how aggregate price delay behaves in business 
cycles. By examining these issues, we hope to shed some light on investor trading behavior 
around business cycles and on the source of asymmetric price delay in reflecting good versus bad 
common information. We find that aggregate stock price delay is pro-cyclical, i.e., more price 
delay during economic expansions and less so during economic recessions. Intriguingly, we also 
find that, instead of market frictions or information production, it is the flight-to-quality behavior 
of investors that is most responsible for changes in the aggregate stock price delay around 
business cycles.
14
  
To assist our analysis, we lay out three hypotheses for explaining how aggregate price 
delay may change as investors anticipate and/or respond to business cycles. The first one is 
related to market frictions. It is well known that market frictions could cause price delay.
15
 As 
Fama (1991) notes that “A weaker and economically more sensible version of the efficiency 
hypothesis says that prices reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting 
on information (the profits to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs (Jensen (1978)).”   
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) show that transaction costs on individual stocks are 
                                                          
14
 According to Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011), the term “flight to quality” refers to a situation where market 
participants suddenly shift their portfolios toward securities with less risk. 
15
 Stocks may have no trading due to large bid-ask spreads. Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) derive a 
transaction cost measure from zero return days. French and Roll (1986) uses stock return variances to study the 
arrival of information and reaction of traders. 
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time-varying and tend to comove together. Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) document 
that large stock market declines increase the demand for liquidity as agents liquidate their 
positions across many assets and reduce the supply of liquidity as liquidity providers hit their 
wealth or funding constraints. Similarly, Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011) show that stock 
liquidity tends to decline before a recession comes and start to improve before an expansion 
begins. Thus, the market frictions hypothesis predicts that aggregate price delay would increase 
as the economy heads towards a recession and decrease as the economy starts to expand. 
The second hypothesis is related to information production. Information production 
activities, such as economists making macroeconomic forecasts, financial analysts generating 
research reports on individual firms, and companies announcing earnings, help institutional 
investors and individual investors to make investment decisions and allocate their wealth to the 
most efficient use. Veldkamp (2005) shows that information production activities increase during 
periods of economic expansions and decrease during periods of recessions.
16
 Brockman, 
Liebenberg, and Schutte (2010) further explore connections among comovement of stocks, 
information production, and business cycle.
17
 They find that when information production is high 
(low), comovement is low (high) and that comovement patterns are countercyclical. Their 
findings imply that when information production on individual firms is lower, market-wide 
information becomes more important, causing individual stocks to comove more. Thus, to the 
                                                          
16
 Veldkamp (2006) hypothesizes when information is costly, rational investors only buy information about a subset 
of assets. Because information production has high fixed costs, competitive producers charge more for low-demand 
information than for high-demand information. The low price of high-demand information makes investors want to 
purchase the same information that others are purchasing. 
17
 Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) use additions to the S&P 500 to distinguish two views of return 
comovement: the traditional view, which attributes it to comovement in news about fundamental value, and an 
alternative view, in which frictions or sentiment delink it from fundamentals. 
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extent that more comovement speeds up the incorporating of market-wide information into stock 
prices, the information production hypothesis predicts that less information production would 
lead to less aggregate stock price delay during recessions. 
The third hypothesis is related to the flight-to-quality behavior of investors, which refers 
to the tendency that when they anticipate the economy is going to enter a recession, investors sell 
risky stocks quickly and shift their funds toward safe securities (see, e.g., Longstaff (2004) and 
Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011)). In line with this hypothesis, McQueen, Pinegar, and 
Thorley (1996) conjecture that investors attempt to sell all stocks quickly when news about the 
economy is bad; conversely, when the news is good, investors quickly buy large, easy to price 
stocks but take their time and shop around before buying smaller stocks. Thus, the flight-to-
quality hypothesis argues that the rush to sell risky stocks, large and small, could speed up stock 
prices to reflect the market-wide information about the coming of a recession, and that aggregate 
price delay would increase due to small, illiquid stocks being left behind when the economy 
starts to expand. 
 We empirically test the aforementioned three hypotheses. First of all, to test the market 
frictions hypothesis, we use Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure and aggregate it across stocks 
in each quarter to obtain an aggregate quarterly measure of market frictions. Our empirical 
results show that, consistent with Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011), the aggregate market 
illiquidity starts to increase before a recession is declared and begins to decrease before an 
expansion starts. Interestingly, the aggregate stock price delay is inversely related to the 
aggregate stock market illiquidity. The aggregate stock price delay declines before a recession 
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comes, and rises before a recession ends. Thus, the evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that the change in aggregate stock price delay is caused by market frictions. 
 Secondly, to proxy for information production, we use institutional holding change, 
analyst coverage change, and dispersion of analyst earnings estimates, and use them to test the 
information production hypothesis.
18
 When stocks have lower institutional holdings, lower 
analyst coverage, and lower dispersion of analyst earnings estimates, information production 
activities on individual firms are usually low. Our empirical results show that the aggregate stock 
price delay is not significantly related to aggregate institutional holding changes, analyst 
coverage changes, or dispersion of analyst earnings estimates. Thus, the information production 
hypothesis also fails to account for the behavior of the aggregate stock price delay. 
 Finally, to measure uncertainty about the economy investors face, we use market returns, 
aggregate volatility from individual stocks, implied market volatility (VIX),
19
 consumer 
confidence index, and U.S. dollar index, and analyze these variables to test the flight-to-quality 
hypothesis. We find that both concurrent market returns and aggregate market volatility have 
significant explanation power on the aggregate stock price delay. In particular, the aggregate 
stock price delay decreases when aggregate market volatility increases and stock market returns 
are negative, and vice versa.  The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the flight-to-
quality behavior of investors speeds up the incorporation of negative market-wide information 
                                                          
18
 Brockman, Liebenberg, and Schutte (2010) expect a positive correlation between variability of analyst coverage 
and the degree of association between comovement and real GDP growth. 
19
 Whaley (2008) mentions that financial news services have begun routinely reporting the level of the CBOE's 
Market Volatility Index or "VIX", for short. Practitioners normally use this index as a fear gauge. 
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into stock prices. Conversely, while better informed investors may start to speculate that the 
market conditions would improve soon, investors in general are uncertain about whether weak 
firms would survive from economic downturns and thus hesitate to buy their shares, causing 
aggregate stock price delay to rise before the onset of economic expansions. 
 Our findings contribute to the market frictions literature in the following ways. First, we 
show that the aggregate stock price delay varies with business cycles. This is contrary to the 
concept that stock price delay is just a firm-specific characteristic. Second, our findings show 
that market information travels faster when investors feel more uncertainty about the future 
economy. It is possible that since it takes two consecutive negative GDP growth quarters to start 
a recession, investors tend to be more alert when they have experienced a negative GDP growth 
quarter and started to pay more attention to changes in economic conditions and contemplate to 
move their wealth to less risky assets if conditions deteriorate, thus speeding up the incorporation 
of market information. Third, we document that the price delay of individual stocks tends to 
decrease and illiquidity of stocks tends to increase before and during a market downturn. This 
finding is different from the cross-section finding of Hou and Moskowitz (2005), who show that 
illiquid stocks tend to have larger price delay. Finally, while trading costs may increase before 
economic downturns arrive, the marginal benefits of acting on the information of possible 
economic downturns may outweigh the increased trading costs. Thus, applying the flight-to-
quality hypothesis to explain the aggregate price delay surrounding business cycles is not 
inconsistent with Fama’s (1991) efficient market hypothesis. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature 
on market frictions hypothesis, information production hypothesis, and flight-to-quality 
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hypothesis. Section 3.3 describes our data and variables used in this paper. Section 3.4 reports 
empirical results. Section 3.5 concludes this essay. 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Market Frictions Hypothesis 
 Fama (1970) argues that the theory of efficient markets is concerned with whether prices 
at any point in time "fully reflect" available information. While presenting several supporting 
evidence of semi-strong form market efficiency in which stock prices fully reflect all public 
available information, Fama (1991) proposes a weaker and economically more sensible version 
of the efficiency hypothesis in which prices reflect information to the point where the marginal 
benefits of acting on information (the profits to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs. 
Accordingly, an increase in trading costs would reduce investors’ trading propensity, and slow 
down the speed with which information is impounded into stock prices.  
 While Hou and Moskowitz (2005) argue that price delay in reflecting public information 
is mainly due to low investor recognition, Lin et al. (2012) show that the price delay 
phenomenon can be better explained by the incidence of nontrading, as measured by Liu’s (2006) 
turnover adjusted non-trading days. Since investors may endogenously decide not to trade if 
transaction costs outweigh the trading benefits (Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999)), more 
incidence of nontrading implies higher (latent) transaction costs. Thus, the evidence presented by 
Lin et al. (2012) is consistent with the market frictions hypothesis that transaction costs hinder 
the transmission of market-wide information, and are the main source of price delay.  
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 In addition, previous studies also provide evidence that price delay results from high 
transaction costs. For example, Lin and Rozeff (1995) examine price adjustment between in-the-
money convertible preferred stock prices and their underlying common stock prices, and find 
that the price deviation from theoretical prediction between these two securities could be largely 
attributed to the transaction costs of arbitrage. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) study 
the relationship between the size of bid-ask spread and market efficiency. They find that short-
horizon return predictability from order flows is diminished when bid-ask spreads are narrower, 
and has declined over time with the minimum tick size. Their findings indicate that liquidity 
stimulates arbitrage activity, which, in turn, enhances market efficiency. Therefore, stock market 
liquidity affects arbitrage activities and further enhance market efficiency. 
 Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) show that transaction costs, such as quoted 
spreads, quoted depth, and effective spreads, of individual stocks are time-varying and tend to 
comove with the aggregate transaction cost of the stock market. Hameed, Kang, and 
Viswanathan (2010) use proportional bid-ask spread as their key measure of liquidity and find 
changes in spreads are negatively related to market returns. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
identify those two correlations as commonality and flight-to-quality liquidity risk measures. Næs, 
Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011) also find stock market liquidity declines before recessions and 
starts to improve before expansions. Since an increase in transaction costs may lead to more 
stock price delay, the market frictions hypothesis posits that aggregate stock price delay will 
increase as the economy approaches to a recession and the stock market becomes less liquid, and 
that aggregate stock price delay will decrease as the economy starts to expand and the market 
becomes more liquid. 
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3.2.2 Information Production Hypothesis 
 Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) document that stock prices move together more in poor 
economies than in rich economies. They attribute their finding to investor property rights - 
higher firm-specific returns variation is associated with stronger public investor property rights. 
In addition, Jin and Myers (2006) show that opaqueness (lack of transparency) is positively 
correlated with R-square of economies observed in the world. Their studies imply that stocks 
comove less in a more open information sharing environment and in an environment which 
encourages information production. 
 Veldkamp (2005) derives a model to show that agents undertake more economic 
activities in good times than in bad and that economic activity generates public information 
about the state of the economy. Following the logic of Morck et al. (2000) and Jin and Myers 
(2006), we can assume stocks may comove less in good times since good economy state 
encourages information production. Brockman, Liebenberg, and Schutte (2010) empirically 
substantiate the relation between information production and stock price comovement. They find 
when information production is high (low), stock price comovement is low (high). In addition, 
they find that comovement patterns are countercyclical. 
 Veldkamp (2006) provides a possible explanation for countercyclical behavior of stock 
price comovement. She derives a model to examine the relationship between information 
production costs and comovement of asset prices. When information is costly, rational investors 
only buy information about a subset of assets. Moreover, when investors price assets using a 
common subset of information, news about one asset affects other assets' prices and asset prices 
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comove. Hameed, Morck, Shen, and Bernard (2008) provide evidences to support this argument. 
They document that neglected stocks are priced using easily available information about other 
stocks that share similar fundamentals. They use number of analysts following a stock to 
distinguish "high profile" stocks from neglected stocks and find that prices of neglected stocks 
tend to comove with those stocks covered by analysts.  
 Since information production activity is low in bad times, we may assume information is 
more costly in bad times. Hence, stocks comove more with easily available market-wide 
information. To the extent that more comovement speeds up the incorporation of market-wide 
information into stock prices, our information production hypothesis assumes that less 
information production activity will cause less aggregate price delay during bad times.  
3.2.3 Flight-to-quality Hypothesis 
 Investors tend to be more alerted and to seek safety when market news is bad. Barberis, 
Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) use additions to the S&P 500 to examine the comovement of stocks 
and suggest stocks respond to general public news more quickly (less price delay) if investors 
recognize those stocks. They attribute the comovement of stocks to friction or sentiment-based 
explanation. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that when the stock market declines, 
traders are forced to liquidate their assets to meet margin requirement or redemption from clients 
and could not provide enough liquidity in the market. Market liquidity and funding liquidity are 
mutually reinforcing and leading to liquidity spirals. At the same time, traders in the market 
move their wealth into assets with lower margin requirement and less volatility : a flight-to-
quality phenomenon when risky securities become especially illiquid.  
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 Longstaff (2004) documents that changes in consumer confidence, the amount of 
Treasury debt available to investors, and flows into equity and money market mutual funds affect 
the flight-to-quality liquidity premium in Treasury bond prices by comparing them with prices of 
bonds issued by Refcorp, a U.S. government agency, whose repayment of both coupon payments 
and principal amounts is implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury. Næs, Skjeltorp, and 
Ødegaard (2011) continue examining the flight-to-quality phenomenon. They use Lesmond et al. 
(1999) implicit trading cost measure, Roll (1984) estimate of the implicit spread, and Amihud 
(2002) price impact measure as liquidity measures in their study and find changes of these 
liquidity measures can predict future real GDP growth, changes in unemployment rate, real 
consumption growth, and growth in private investment after controlling current real GDP growth, 
term spread, credit spread, market volatility, and market excess return. They suggest their 
findings emerge from the flight-to-quality behavior of investors changing their portfolio 
compositions from small, illiquid stocks to liquid, low risk securities.  
 McQueen, Pinegar, and Thorley (1996) provide another evidence to support the flight-to-
quality phenomenon. They find public bad news reflects in small stocks without much delay and 
a delayed reaction to good news for small stocks. They conjecture investors attempt to sell all 
stocks quickly when the market news is bad and take time to shop around small stocks when the 
market news is good. Intrigued by their findings and the flight-to-quality behavior of investors, 
we develop our flight-to-quality hypothesis. Our flight-to-quality hypothesis claims that the rush 
of investors to sell all risky stocks will speed up stock prices to reflect the market-wide 
information about the coming of a recession and that aggregate stock price delay will decrease 
due to small, illiquid stocks being left behind when the economy starts to expand. Aggregate 
stock price delay should be pro-cyclical according to the flight-to-quality hypothesis. 
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3.3 Data 
 We use Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to collect stock return information. 
Our sample includes common stocks (with share code 10 or 11) listed on the NYSE from Jan 
1945 to Dec 2010. In addition, we require each stock in our sample to be listed for the whole 
calendar year and its daily share price should be greater than $1 per share during the whole 
calendar year.  We use the quarterly real GDP number from 1947Q1 to 2010Q4 of the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) to construct the real GDP growth in each quarter. The institutional 
holding (13f) data is from Thomson Reuters for the period from 1980Q1 to 2008Q4. We use 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) to collect quarterly analyst coverage (number of 
analysts following) of each firm in our sample. The analyst coverage data starts from 1984Q4 
(1032 firms with analyst coverage) to 2010Q4 since there are only 110 firms with analyst 
coverage for our sample in 1984Q3. We use the Bloomberg terminal to collect consumer 
confidence index and U.S. dollar index data. The consumer confidence index data starts from 
February 1967 and the U.S. dollar index starts from January 1967. 
3.3.1 Price Delay Measure 
 We follow Hou and Moskowitz (2005) to construct our price delay measure. The 
regression equations are as follows: 
tjtmjjtj Rr ,,,    (3.1) 

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(3.2) 
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where tjr ,  is the weekly return of stock j and tmR ,  is the CRSP value-weighted market return in 
week  t . For stocks in our sample, we run time series regressions (52 past weekly observations) 
for both equation (1) and (2) every week from 1947 to 2010 to get the 2R
 
from both the 
restricted regression (1) and unrestricted regression (2). The price delay measure in our study is 
defined as follows: 
dunrestrcte
restricted
R
R
D
2
2
11   (3.3) 
 The intuition of this measure could be described as follows: the restrictedR
2
 
measures a 
stock’s return variation explained by the concurrent market return and the edunrestrictR
2
 
measures a 
stock’s return variation explained by the concurrent plus four past weekly market returns. If the 
ratio between this two number is high (approaching to 1), there is not much additional 
explanatory power by adding past weekly market returns in the regression and the delay of 
market information transmission for the stock is low. Hence, the larger 1D , the more stock return 
variation is captured by lagged weekly market returns and then the more price delay for the stock. 
After we get weekly price delay measures for each stock from 1947 to 2010, we keep the price 
delay observation in the end of March, June, September, and December to be each stock’s price 
delay measure in the end of each quarter. We further take the equally weighted average of each 
stock’s individual price delay measure to get aggregate stock price delay measure 1AggreD  and 
its change for each quarter from 1947Q2 to 2010Q4. The augmented Dicky-Fuller test shows 
that aggregate stock price delay is stationary. 
11 ln( 1 / 1 )t t tdAggreD AggreD AggreD   (3.4) 
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3.3.2 GDP Growth 
 We use seasonally adjusted quarterly real gross domestic product (GDP) from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis to measure the economy state. The quarterly data are in the unit of billions of 
chained 2005 dollars. Following Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011), we take logarithm 
difference of the real GDP series to measure changes in economy from 1947Q2 to 2010Q4.  
)/ln( 1 ttt GDPRGDPRdGDPR  (3.5) 
3.3.3 Market Frictions Variable 
 We use daily Amihud (2002) price impact measure 



TD
t ti
ti
TTi
VOL
R
DILLIQ
1 ,
,
, /1  (3.6) 
to measure stock market illiquidity (market friction) in a quarter in this study, where TD  is the 
number of trading days within a time window T , tiR ,
 
is the absolute return on day t  for 
security  i  , and tiVOL ,  is the dollar trading volume (in millions) of security i  on day t . We 
calculate each stock’s daily price impact, defined as its absolute return divided by its daily dollar 
trading volume (in millions) first and then take each stock’s quarterly price impact average to be 
each stock’s quarterly price impact. We further use equally-weighted quarterly price impact of 
each stock in the sample to represent the stock market friction measure. Since it is an illiquidity 
measure, a higher number of the measure means a less liquid stock market and the market 
friction is high. We also take a logarithm difference of the aggregate price impact to measure the 
market friction change in the stock market from 1947Q2 to 2010Q4.  
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)/ln( 1 ttt ILLIQILLIQdILLIQ  (3.7) 
3.3.4 Information Production Variables 
 We use institutional ownership, analyst coverage, and dispersion of analyst earnings 
estimates for information production proxies in our study. For institutional ownership, we divide 
the sum of shares owned of institutions by shares outstanding of the firm to calculate each 
sample firm’s institutional holding. For each quarter, we take the equally-weighted average of 
each sample firm’s institutional holding to be the aggregate institutional holding and take 
logarithm difference of the aggregate institutional holding to measure changes in aggregate 
institutional ownership from 1985Q1 to 2010Q4.  
)/ln( 1 ttt INSHDINSHDdINSHD  (3.8) 
 For analyst coverage, for firms’ fiscal quarter end in January, February, and last 
December, their observations on I/B/E/S are classified into the first quarter of the current year. 
Similarly, for firms’ fiscal quarter end in September, October, and November, their observations 
on I/B/E/S are classified into the fourth quarter of the current year. For each firm, we take the 
latest number of analysts for earnings estimates for each estimated period to be a firm’s analyst 
coverage. We further take the equally-weighted average of each firm’s analyst coverage to be the 
aggregate analyst coverage and take logarithm difference of the aggregate analyst coverage to 
measure changes in aggregate analyst coverage from 1985Q1 to 2010Q4. 
)/ln( 1 ttt ANALYSTANALYSTdANALYST  (3.9) 
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  For the dispersion of analyst earnings estimates, we follow the same quarter definition as 
analyst coverage. We take the standard deviation of each analyst's earnings forecast of a firm in a 
quarter to be the firm's dispersion of analyst earnings estimates. We winsorize firms with 
extreme value at 99%. We further take the equally-weighted average of each firm's dispersion of 
analyst earnings estimates to be aggregate dispersion of analyst earnings estimates and take 
logarithm difference of aggregate analyst earnings estimates to measure changes in aggregate 
dispersion of analyst earnings estimates from 1985Q1 to 2010Q4. 
1ln( / )t t tdDispersion Dispersion Dispersion   (3.10) 
3.3.5 Flight-to-quality Variables 
 When the market news is bad, investors tend to sell all stocks quickly. Under this 
circumstance, the stock market return is usually very negative and the market volatility is 
relatively high. Therefore, we use stock market return and stock market volatility to be flight-to-
quality variables in our study. For the stock market return, we use the cumulative 3-month 
monthly S&P 500 index return to calculate the quarterly stock market return. For the stock 
market volatility, we calculate each sample stock’s quarterly return volatility and then take the 
equally-weighted average of these sample stocks’ return volatility to be the quarterly market 
volatility. We also include equally-weighted average of daily VIX to represent the quarterly 
market volatility from 1990Q1 to 2010Q4. In addition, Longstaff (2004) finds investors tend to 
move their wealth into less risky securities when consumer confidence is lower. Furthermore, 
investors also have higher demand for U.S. dollars when their uncertainty about the economy is 
high. Therefore, we also use quarterly change of consumer confidence index and quarterly 
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change of U.S. dollar index from Bloomberg to be another two proxies for flight-to-quality 
variables from 1967Q3 to 2010Q4. 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Summary Statistics of Variables 
 Our study investigates the relation between stock price delay and business cycle. As 
shown in Fig 3.1, the aggregate stock price delay comoves with the real GDP growth rate. The 
aggregate stock price delay tends to go higher when the GDP growth rate is higher. In addition, 
Fig 3.2 shows the change of aggregate stock price delay has a positive relation with the real GDP 
growth rate in the next quarter. Furthermore, from the past 11 recessions (defined by National 
Bureau of Economic Research), Fig 3.3 shows that the aggregate stock price delay declines in 
the starting quarter of each past 11 recession and the aggregate stock price delay remains low for 
the following quarters after recessions start. Fig 3.4 shows that the aggregate stock price delay 
starts to increase after each recession ends. From 1947 to 2010, our data show that aggregate 
stock  price delay tends to comove with a business cycle. Therefore, market information 
transmission becomes faster when the economy is going to be bad and market information 
transmission becomes slower when the economy is going to recover. Table 3.1 summarizes our 
sample characteristics. During the overall sample period from 1947 to 2010, the quarterly change 
of the aggregate price delay is – 0.03%, showing that the market information transmission is 
becoming faster through these years. In addition, the aggregate price impact (our market friction) 
measure also declines over these years. The aggregate price delay may become lower due to a 
more liquid stock market. From 1985Q1 to 2008Q4 when we have our institutional ownership, 
analyst coverage, and dispersion of analyst earnings estimates data, the quarterly average 
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changes for those three variables are positive during this period. However, during past recession 
starting quarters after 1985, the number of analyst coverage tends to decline although the 
institutional holding does not change much. The aggregate dispersion of analyst earnings 
estimates seems increasing from the start of past three recessions. This fact  shows that analysts 
may have more diverse opinions about a firm's earnings per share when the overall market 
uncertainty is high even though the information production activity may decrease. Our sample 
period for flight-to-quality variables such as market return, market volatility, change in consumer 
confidence index and change in U.S. dollar index is from 1967Q3 to 2010Q4. Over the whole 
period, average quarterly market return and volatility are positive and average quarterly changes 
 
Figure 3.1 Aggregate Stock Price Delay and Real GDP Growth 
The figure shows time-series plots of the aggregate stock price delay of sample firms and real GDP growth from 
1947 to 2010. The sample firms include common stocks listed on the NYSE with stock price above $1 per share, 
listing for the whole calendar year. The left axis is for the solid line and aggregate price delay measure. The right 
axis is for the dotted line and real GDP growth rate. 
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Figure 3.2 Lagged Aggregate Stock Price Delay Change and Real GDP Growth 
The figure shows time-series plots of the lagged aggregate stock price delay change of sample firms and real GDP 
growth from 1947 to 2010. The sample firms include common stocks listed on the NYSE with stock price above $1 
per share, listing for the whole calendar year. The left axis is for the solid line and the lagged aggregate stock price 
delay change measure. The right axis is for the dotted line and real GDP growth rate. 
 
Figure 3.3 Aggregate Stock Price Delay in the Quarters around the Past 11 Recession Starting Quarter 
The figure shows the aggregate stock price delay of sample firms in this study from 3 quarters before each recession 
starts to 3 quarters after each recession starts. The sample firms include common stocks listed on the NYSE with 
stock price above $1 per share, listing for the whole calendar year. According to the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), R1 is from Nov 1948 to Oct 1949, R2 is from July 1953 to May 1954, R3 is from Aug 1957 to 
Apr 1958, R4 is from Apr 1960 to Feb 1961, R5 is from Dec 1969 to Nov 1970, R6 is from Nov 1973 to March 
1975, R7 is from Jan 1980 to July 1980, R8 is from July 1981 to Nov 1982, R9 is from July 1990 to March 1991, 
R10 is from March 2001 to Nov 2001, and R11 is from Dec 2007 to June 2009. Q(-3) indicates the quarter in which 
three quarters before the recession starts, Q(0) indicates the recession starting quarter, and Q(+3) indicates the 
quarter in which three quarters after the recession starts. 
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Figure 3.4 Aggregate Stock Price Delay in the Quarters around the Past 11 Recession Ending Quarter 
The figure shows the aggregate price delay of sample firms in this study from 3 quarters before each recession ends 
to 3 quarters after each recession ends. The sample firms include common stocks listed on the NYSE with stock 
price above $1 per share, listing for the whole calendar year. According to the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER), R1 is from Nov 1948 to Oct 1949, R2 is from July 1953 to May 1954, R3 is from Aug 1957 to 
Apr 1958, R4 is from Apr 1960 to Feb 1961, R5 is from Dec 1969 to Nov 1970, R6 is from Nov 1973 to March 
1975, R7 is from Jan 1980 to July 1980, R8 is from July 1981 to Nov 1982, R9 is from July 1990 to March 1991, 
R10 is from March 2001 to Nov 2001, and R11 is from Dec 2007 to June 2009. Q(-3) indicates the quarter in which 
three quarters before the recession ends, Q(0) indicates the recession ending quarter, and Q(+3) indicates the quarter 
in which three quarters after the recession ends. 
in consumer confidence index and U.S. dollar index are negative. The VIX measure starts from 
1990Q1 and the average VIX is 20.40 from 1990Q1 to 2010Q4.  
 For the past eleven recessions, aggregate stock price delay tends to decline, analyst 
coverage tends to decrease, price impact increases, market return is negative, consumer 
confidence drops, and term spread also shortens. On average in the recession starting quarter, 
aggregate stock price delay declines 10.8%, analyst coverage decreases 2.22%, stock market 
price impact increases 7.59%, quarterly market return is negative 6.94%, consumer confidence 
index drops 9.18%, and term spread becomes narrower to 0.36%. When recessions end, 
aggregate stock price delay increases 1.24% , analyst coverage increases 3.57%, stock market 
price impact decreases 35.91%, quarterly market return is positive 12.46%, consumer confidence 
index increases 7.38%, and term spread becomes wider to 2.20%. Table 3.2 reports the
53 
 
Table 3.1 Sample Characteristics 
 
1947Q1 to 
2010Q4 
1953Q3 to 
2010Q4 
1967Q3 to 
2010Q4 
1985Q1 to 
2008Q4 
1990Q1 to 
2010Q4 
Past 11 recession 
Starting quarters 
Past 11 recession  
Ending quarters 
main variables 
  
 
 
 
  
dAggreD1t -0.03% -0.41% -0.45% -0.85% -1.47% -10.80% 1.24% 
dGDPRt 0.79% 0.75% 0.71% 0.69% 0.62% 0.22% -0.21% 
information production 
  
 
 
 
  
dINSHDt   
 0.87% 0.82% 0.50% 1.21% 
dANALYSTt   
 1.07% 1.06% -2.22% 3.57% 
dDispersiont   
 0.68% 0.20% 8.65% -0.44% 
market friction 
  
 
 
 
  
dILLIQt -1.79% -1.62% -1.23% -1.20% -2.80% 7.59% -35.91% 
Flight-to-quality  
  
 
 
 
  
Mkrett  
2.05% 1.88% 2.11% 1.86% -6.94% 12.46% 
Volatilityt  
2.21% 2.37% 2.39% 2.48% 2.35% 2.45% 
VIXt   
 
 
20.40 24.32 27.81 
dCCIt   
-0.51% -0.94% -0.84% -9.18% 7.38% 
dUSDindext   
-0.24% -0.58% -0.25% -0.52% -1.21% 
control variables 
  
 
 
 
  
Term_spreadt  
1.41% 1.58% 1.75% 1.85% 0.36% 2.20% 
Default_ spreadt  
0.98% 1.10% 0.96% 0.95% 0.97% 1.34% 
number of firms 1408 1467 1605 1610 1561 1316 1345 
number of quarters 264 230 174 96 84 11 11 
                            
This table reports the average value of variables used in this study during the whole sample period and each sub-periods. The sample firms include NYSE 
common stocks with stock price above $1 and listing for the whole calendar year during the sample period from 1947Q1 to 2010Q4. The aggregate price delay 
change dAggreD1t
 
 is the logarithm difference between each equally-weighted individual stock price delay of each quarter t 
 
and previous quarter t-1. The real 
GDP growth dGDPRt is the logarithm difference of real GDP between current quarter t
 
and previous quarter t-1. The aggregate institutional holding change 
dINSHDt is the logarithm difference between the equally-weighted average of percentages of sample stocks held by institution investors of quarter t and previous 
quarter t-1. The aggregate analyst coverage change dANALYSTt is the logarithm difference between the equally-weighted number of analysts of individual stocks 
of quarter t and previous quarter t-1. The aggregate dispersion of analyst earnings estimates is the logarithm difference between the equally-weighted standard 
deviation of analyst earnings estimates of each company of quarter t and previous quarter t-1. The aggregate price impact change dILLIQt is the logarithm 
difference between the equally-weighted quarterly individual stock price impact from Amuhuid (2002) of quarter t 
 
and previous quarter t-1. The market return 
Mkrett is the 3-month cumulative monthly S&P 500 index return of the quarter. The market volatility Volatilityt  is from equally weighted average of the sample 
firms’ stock return standard deviation during the quarter. The VIX index VIXt is the implied volatility of S&P500 index from CBOE. The consumer confidence 
index change dCCIt is the logarithm difference between the quarter t and previous quarter t-1. The U.S. dollar index change dUSDindext is the logarithm  
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(Table 3.1 continued)                             
difference between the quarter t and previous quarter t-1. The term spread Term_spreadt
 
is the yield difference between 10-year Treasury note rate and 3-month 
Treasury bill rate. The default spread Default_ spreadt 
 
is the difference between Moody’s Baa bond yield and Moody’s Aaa bond yield. Throughout the study, 
the term spread information starts from 1953Q3, the consumer confidence index and U.S. dollar index start from 1967Q3, the institutional ownership change and 
the aggregate analyst coverage change information starts from 1985Q1, the aggregate institutional holding change information ends in 2008Q4, and the S&P 
implied volatility index starts from 1990Q1.                                                                                           
Table 3.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
dAggreD1t-1 dINSHDt-1 dANALYSTt-1 dDispersiont-1 dILLIQt-1 Mkrett-1 Volatilityt-1 VIXt-1 dCCIt-1 dUSDindext-1 Term_spreadt-1 Default_ spreadt-1 
dGDPRt 0.23 0.13 0.20 0.03 -0.35 0.29 -0.28 -0.34 0.38 -0.05 0.15 -0.22 
 
(0.0002) (<.0001) (0.0411) (0.7525) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0017) (<.0001) (0.5402) (0.0276) (0.0005) 
dAggreD1t-1  0.13 0.04 0.13 -0.29 0.33 -0.32 -0.35 0.12 0.08 0.03 -0.09 
 
 (0.2119) (0.6875) (0.1733) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0011) (0.1116) (0.2641) (0.6439) (0.1393) 
dINSHDt-1   -0.06 0.17 -0.47 0.24 -0.23 -0.12 0.09 0.05 0.08 -0.03 
 
  (0.5353) (0.1070) (<.0001) (0.0187) (0.0248) (0.2880) (0.3966) (0.6104) (0.4140) (0.7614) 
dANALYSTt-1   
 
0.33 0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.17 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 
 
  
 
(0.0007) (0.4795) (0.7169) (0.9525) (0.6869) (0.0833) (0.5121) (0.5947) (0.7143) 
dDispersiont-1     0.05 0.07 0.03 0.14 -0.19 0.04 -0.12 0.11 
 
  
  
(0.6243) (0.4673) (0.7598) (0.1999) (0.0482) (0.6964) (0.2208) (0.2502) 
dILLIQt-1   
   
-0.46 0.27 0.43 -0.41 0.02 -0.10 0.07 
 
  
   
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.7810) (0.1349) (0.2337) 
Mkrett-1       -0.30 -0.35 0.21 -0.14 0.11 -0.02 
 
  
    
(<.0001) (0.0011) (0.0055) (0.0713) (0.1014) (0.8147) 
Volatilityt-1   
     
0.89 -0.29 0.10 0.13 0.54 
 
  
     
(<.0001) (0.0001) (0.2028) (0.0498) (<.0001) 
VIXt-1         -0.37 0.11 0.09 0.76 
 
  
      
(0.0005) (0.3207) (0.4409) (<.0001) 
dCCIt-1   
       
0.06 0.13 -0.16 
 
  
       
(0.4365) (0.0843) (0.0401) 
dUSDindext-1           -0.07 0.15 
 
  
        
(0.3407) (0.0401) 
Term_spreadt-1   
        
 0.29 
 
  
        
 (<0.0001) 
This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between variables used in the analysis. The associated p-values are reported in parentheses below each 
correlation coefficient. 
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correlation among variables used in this study. The real GDP growth has statistically significant 
correlation with variables in the previous quarter: positive correlation 23% with the aggregate 
price delay change, positive correlation 13% with institutional holding change, positive 
correlation 20% with analyst coverage change, negative correlation 35% with stock market price 
impact, positive correlation 29% with stock market return, negative correlation 28% with stock 
market volatility, negative correlation 34% with VIX, positive correlation 38% with consumer 
confidence change, positive correlation 15% with term spread, and negative correlation 22% 
with default spread.  
 One interesting observation here is the aggregate analyst coverage change has a positive 
correlation with future GDP growth. For the main variable aggregate price delay change, we find 
it has a negative correlation 29% with the aggregate stock market price impact change, a positive 
correlation 33% with market return, a negative correlation 32% with stock market volatility, and 
a negative correlation 35% with VIX. We continue investigating aggregate stock price delay 
change property in the following tables. For the institutional ownership change, we find it has a 
negative correlation 47% with stock market price impact change, a positive correlation 24% with 
stock market return, and a negative correlation 23% with stock market volatility. Analyst 
coverage change has a positive correlation 33% with dispersion of analyst earnings estimates and 
suggests that more information productivity may lead to more different opinions from analysts. 
Changes in dispersion of analyst earnings estimates have negative correlation 19% with changes 
in consumer confidence index and this fact suggests that analysts tend to have more diverse 
opinions when the market uncertainty is high. Stock market price impact change has a negative 
correlation 46% with stock market return, a positive correlation 27% with stock market volatility 
a positive correlation 43% with VIX, and a negative correlation 41% with changes in consumer
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confidence index. Stock market return has a negative correlation 30% with stock market 
volatility, a negative correlation 35% with VIX, and a positive correlation 21% with changes in 
consumer confidence index. Stock market volatility has a positive correlation 89% with VIX, a 
negative correlation 29% with changes in consumer confidence index, a positive correlation 13% 
with term spread, and a positive correlation 54% with default spread. VIX has a negative 
correlation 37% with changes in consumer confidence index and a positive correlation 76% with 
default spread. Changes in consumer confidence index have a negative correlation 16% with 
default spread. Changes in U.S. dollar index have a positive correlation 15% with default spread. 
Finally, term spread has a positive correlation 29% with default spread. 
3.4.2 Regression Results 
 We examine the prediction power of the aggregate stock price delay change on future 
GDP growth in Table 3.3. The model estimated is as follows: 
1 1 2 1 3 1
4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1
* 1 * *
* _ * _ * *
t t t t
t t t t t
dGDPR dAggreD dGDPR dILLIQ
term spread default spread Volatility MKret
   
    
  
   
   
    
 (3.11) 
The aggregate price delay change significantly predict future GDP growth rate after we add 
current GDP growth rate, aggregate stock price impact change, term spread, and default spread. 
However, the predictable power of the aggregate stock price delay change disappears after we 
add market excess return and stock market volatility into our regression. This result may be due 
to the high correlation 33% between stock market return and the aggregate stock price delay 
change. The aggregate stock price impact change still maintains its explanatory power on future 
GDP growth rate. Hence, stock market liquidity change is more powerful than stock price delay 
change in predicting future economy change. 
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 We test the market frictions hypothesis in Table 3.4. The model estimated is as follows: 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD dILLIQ term spread default spread          (3.12) 
The results show that the change in the aggregate stock price impact significantly explains the 
change in the aggregate price delay. However, the sign is negative, which is in contrast to our 
prediction that higher market frictions lead to higher stock price delay. Our results show that the 
aggregate stock price delay tends to decline when market frictions are higher. Hence, our 
empirical evidence contradicts our market frictions hypothesis. 
 We test our information production hypothesis in Table 3.5. The models estimated are as 
follows: 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD dINSHD term spread default spread          (3.13) 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD dANALYST term spread default spread          (3.14) 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD dANALYST term spread default spread        
 
(3.15) 
The results show that changes in institutional ownership, changes in analyst coverage, and 
changes in dispersion of analyst earnings estimates fail to significantly explain the change in the 
aggregate stock price delay although their coefficients are positive. Hence, we reject our 
information production hypothesis. Finally, we test our flight-to-quality hypothesis in Table 3.6. 
The models estimated are as follows: 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD Mkret term spread default spread          (3.16) 
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Table 3.3 Aggregate Price Delay Change and Real GDP Growth 
Dependent 
variable intercept 
 
dAggreD1t-1 
 
 
dGDPRt-1 
 
 
dILLIQt-1 
 
 
Term_spreadt-1 
 
Default_ spreadt-1 
 
Volatilityt-1 
 
Mkrett-1 
 
Adj_RSQ 
 
dGDPRt 
 
 
0.0053*** 0.0121*** 0.3420*** 
     
0.1610 
 
(6.83) (3.80) (5.64) 
      
dGDPRt 
 
0.0055*** 0.0076** 0.2986*** -0.0086*** 
    
0.2172 
 
(7.63) (2.50) (4.94) (-4.19) 
     
          
dGDPRt 
 
0.0069*** 0.0060** 0.2444*** -0.0080*** 0.1211** -0.3088** 
  
0.2404 
 
(3.97) (2.13) (3.19) (-3.99) (2.44) (-2.33) 
   
          
dGDPRt 
 
0.0079*** 0.0038 0.2459*** -0.0062*** 0.1118** -0.2558* -0.0647 0.0150** 0.2482 
 
(2.86) (1.26) (3.11) (-2.83) (2.31) (-1.79) (-0.61) (2.05) 
 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
This table reports the results by regressing the real GDP growth in the current quarter on the aggregate price delay change in the previous quarter after controlling 
several variables in the previous quarter. The model estimated is 
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1
7 1
* 1 * * * _ * _ *
*
t t t t t t t
t t
dGDPR dAggreD dGDPR dILLIQ term spread default spread Volatility
Mkret
      
 
     

      
 
 
For regression without the term spread, the time period is from 1947Q3 to 2010Q4 and for regression including the term spread, the time period is from 1953Q3 
to 2010Q4. The Newey-West corrected t-statistics (with Bartlett kernel with a lag length of 4) are reported in parentheses below the coefficients estimates. 
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Table 3.4 Aggregate Price Delay and Market Frictions 
Dependent 
variable intercept 
 
dILLIQt 
 
 
Term_spreadt 
 
 
Default_ spreadt 
 
 
Adj_RSQ 
 
 
dAggreD1t 
 
-0.0028 -0.1427*** 
  
0.0777 
 
(-0.34) (-3.85) 
   
dAggreD1t 
 
0.0087 -0.1380*** 0.2624 -1.9884 0.0710 
 
(0.34) (-3.76) (0.36) (-0.74) 
 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
This table reports the results by regressing the aggregate price delay change in the current quarter on the aggregate price impact change in the concurrent quarter 
after controlling current term spread and default spread. The model estimated is 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD dILLIQ term spread default spread          
For regression without term spread, the time period is from 1947Q3 to 2010Q4 and for regression including term spread, the time period is from 1953Q3 to 
2010Q4. The Newey-West corrected t-statistics (with Bartlett kernel with a lag length of 4) are reported in parentheses below the coefficients estimates. 
 
Table 3.5
 
Aggregate Price Delay and Information Production
 
Panel A 
    Dependent 
variable Intercept dINSHDt Term_spreadt Default_ spreadt Adj_RSQ 
dAggreD1t -0.0239 1.7672 
  
0.0061 
 
(-1.28) (1.55) 
   
dAggreD1t 
 
0.0605 1.7147 -0.3647 -8.0611 0.0277 
 
(1.24) (1.53) (-0.31) (-1.64) 
 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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(Table 3.5 continued) 
Panel B 
Dependent 
variable Intercept dANALYSTt Term_spreadt Default_ spreadt Adj_RSQ 
dAggreD1t -0.0100 0.0549 
  
0.0016 
 
(-0.77) (0.59) 
   dAggreD1t 0.0773** 0.0450 0.4932 -9.6338** 0.0325 
 
(2.19) (0.49) (0.39) (-2.46) 
 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel C 
Dependent 
variable Intercept dDispersiont Term_spreadt Default_ spreadt Adj_RSQ 
dAggreD1t -0.0109 0.1221 
  
0.0082 
 
(-0.85) (1.12) 
   dAggreD1t 0.0790** 0.1590 0.9302 -10.6434** 0.0625 
 
(2.18) (1.71) (0.76) (-2.64) 
 
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
This table reports the results by regressing the aggregate price delay change in the current quarter on the aggregate institutional holding change , the aggregate 
analyst coverage change, and the dispersion of analyst earnings estimates change in the concurrent quarter after controlling current term spread and default 
spread. The models estimated are 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD dINSHD term spread default spread        
 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD dANALYST term spread default spread        
 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD dDispersion term spread default spread          
For regression with the aggregate institutional holding, the time period is from 1984Q4 to 2008Q4 and for regression with the aggregate analyst coverage and 
dispersion of analyst earnings estimates change, the time period is from 1984Q4 to 2010Q4. The Newey-West corrected t-statistics (with Bartlett kernel with a 
lag length of 4) are reported in parentheses below the coefficients estimates. 
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1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD Volatility term spread default spread          (3.17) 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD VIX term spread default spread          (3.18) 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD dCCI term spread default spread        
 
(3.19) 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD dUSDindex term spread default spread        
 
(3.20) 
1 2 3
54
1 * * *
* _ * _
t t t t
t t t
dAggreD Mkret Volatility dILLIQ
term spread default spread
   
  
   
    
(3.21) 
Our empirical results show that both current market return and market volatility significantly 
explain the changes in the aggregate stock price delay. The aggregate stock price delay tends to 
increase when the stock market return is negative and when the stock market volatility is higher. 
Changes in consumer confidence index and changes in U.S. dollar index fail to significantly 
explain changes in aggregate stock price delay. After we add the change in stock market price 
impact into the regression, the explanation power of the flight-to-quality variables still exists. 
Therefore, we attribute the aggregate price delay change to flight-to-quality behavior of investors. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 This essay studies the relationship between stock price delay and business cycle. We 
empirically test whether information production, market frictions, and flight-to-quality could 
provide explanations for stock price delay change in a business cycle. Our findings show that 
institutional holding, analyst coverage, and dispersion of analyst earnings estimates could not 
significantly account for changes in stock price delay through time. In addition, while stock 
market liquidity dries up and transaction costs increase during a recession, stock price delay
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Table 3.6 Aggregate Price Delay and Flight-to-quality 
Panel A 
Dependent 
variable Intercept Mkrett Term_spreadt Default_ spreadt Adj_RSQ 
dAggreD1t -0.0131 0.6266***   0.1034 
 (-1.45) (3.91)    
dAggreD1t 0.0034 0.6272*** 0.2110 -2.4503 0.1048 
 (0.14) (3.83) (0.26) (-0.93)  
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel B 
Dependent 
variable intercept Volatilityt Term_spreadt Default_ spreadt Adj_RSQ 
dAggreD1t 0.1678*** -7.7540***   0.0986 
 (4.94) (-5.08)    
dAggreD1t 0.1543*** -9.2208*** 0.5666 3.7337 0.0996 
 (4.11) (-3.86) (0.75) (1.28)  
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel C 
Dependent 
variable intercept VIXt Term_spreadt Default_ spreadt Adj_RSQ 
dAggreD1t 0.1133** -0.0063***   0.1118 
 (2.53) (-2.91)    
dAggreD1t 0.1046*** -0.0036 0.8596 -6.4414 0.1071 
 (3.07) (-1.33) (0.68) (-1.41)  
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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(Table 3.6 continued) 
Panel D 
Dependent 
variable intercept dCCIt Term_spreadt Default_ spreadt Adj_RSQ 
dAggreD1t -0.0030 0.1382   0.0089 
 (-0.33) (1.49)    
dAggreD1t 0.0215 0.1197 0.2601 -2.6217 0.0039 
 (0.62) (1.45) (0.31) (-0.74)  
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel E 
Dependent 
variable intercept dUSDindext Term_spreadt Default_ spreadt Adj_RSQ 
dAggreD1t -0.0029 0.3305   0.0015 
 (-0.30) (0.87)    
dAggreD1t 0.0302 0.4199 0.5845 -3.8420 0.0048 
 (0.82) (1.25) (0.71) (-1.00)  
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel F 
Dependent 
variable intercept Volatilityt Mkrett dILLIQt Term_spreadt Default_ spreadt Adj_RSQ 
dAggreD1t 0.1008*** -6.2821*** 0.3830*** -0.0595** 0.1166 2.3315 0.1585 
 (2.95) (-3.20) (2.64) (-2.05) (0.17) (0.92)  
***, **, * significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
This table reports the results by regressing the aggregate price delay change in the current quarter on the market return or the market volatility of the concurrent 
quarter after controlling current term spread and default spread. The models estimated are 
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(Table 3.6 continued) 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD Mkret term spread default spread        
 
and 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD Volatility term spread default spread        
 
and 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD VIX term spread default spread          
and 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD dCCI term spread default spread          
and 
1 2 31 * * _ * _t t t t tdAggreD dUSDindex term spread default spread          
For regression without the term spread, the time period is from 1947Q2 to 2010Q4 and for regression including the term spread, the time period is from 1953Q2 
to 2010Q4. For regression with consumer confidence index and U.S. dollar index, the time period is from 1967Q3 to 2010Q4. The Newey-West corrected t-
statistics (with Bartlett kernel with a lag length of 4) are reported in parentheses below the coefficients estimates. In the Panel F of this table, we report the 
regression result for the model estimated: 
1 2 3 4
5
1 * * * * _
* _
t t t t t
t t
dAggreD Mkret Volatility dILLIQ term spread
default spread
    
 
     

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declines and market information transmission become faster in the meantime. Finally, stock 
market return, stock market volatility, changes in consumer confidence index, and changes in 
U.S. dollar index subsume a great portion of stock price delay variation during business cycles. 
Our results imply when investors feel high level of uncertainty when market news is bad, they 
sell risky securities such as stocks. Because high transaction costs of stocks will not hinder 
investors' selling activities that much when investors' expectation about economy is bad, we 
conclude flight-to-quality behavior of investors most accounts for stock price delay change in a 
business cycle. 
 Previous studies show that stocks tend to comove when the market news is bad. We add 
new evidence that stocks reflect market information faster when current market news is bad and 
future GDP growth is going to slow down. We find stock price delay acts pro-cyclically and only 
the flight-to-quality behavior of investors explains this phenomenon well. This finding helps our 
understanding of stock price formation process during the transitions of business cycles and 
provides another indicator for the future economy state. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation examines changes of aggregate analyst forecast errors and aggregate 
stock price delay in a business cycle. In the first essay we find aggregate analyst forecast errors 
fluctuate with concurrent GDP growth rate. After controlling the predictable component of the 
aggregate analyst forecast errors, we find past stock market liquidity change loses its explanation 
power on the economy. Those results indicate that smart investors' informed trading is built on 
their information advantages over financial analysts. In the second essay we find aggregate stock 
price delay has a pro-cyclical pattern. Both market frictions and information production 
explanations fail to account for this phenomenon. We find only flight-to-quality behavior of 
investors is most responsible for this pro-cyclical aggregate stock price delay behavior. Investors 
move their wealth to safer assets such as more liquid stocks, Treasury securities, or even just 
cash when they feel very uncertain about the economy and when the economy is bad. 
 Since both aggregate analyst forecast errors and aggregate stock price delay highly 
correlate with the real GDP growth rate, innovations of both these two variables could be used as 
state variables to represent information risk factors in future asset pricing research. In addition, 
the correlation level between aggregate analyst forecast errors and the real GDP growth rate may 
signal the quality of analysts in different countries. Higher correlation between the aggregate 
analyst forecast errors and the real GDP growth rate may imply more informed trading and a less 
efficient market. Finally, we may also compare aggregate analyst forecast errors and aggregate 
stock price delay of different industries to know more about the differences among industries. 
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